Quasi-realism is the meta-ethical view claiming that
ethical sentences do not express propositions. Ethical sentences project emotional
attitudes as if they were real properties. Quasi-realism is a form of non-cognitivism or
expressivism. Quasi-realism stands in opposition to emotivism and universal
prescriptivism, including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism. Aesthetic
judgements are autonomous, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because
several others share a different opinion.
Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are
not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. This expressivism needs
combining with some analogue of cognitive command, the idea that disagreements over beuaty
can occur, and when they do it is a priori that one side has infringed the norms governing aesthetic discourse. This combination can be achieved
by reading Immanuel Kant's aesthetic theory in
expressivist terms. The resulting view is a form of quasi-realism about beauty. This
conclusion generalises to quasi-realism about other matters.
Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of
Aesthetic Judgement - Hopkins, Robert, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol 9, Num
2, August 2001.
QUASI-REALISM, ACQUAINTANCE, AND THE NORMATIVE
CLAIMS OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT - Cain Samuel. My is to outline a quasi-realist
theory of aesthetic judgement. Robert Hopkins has argued against the plausibility of this
project because he claims that quasi-realism cannot explain a central component of any
expressivist understanding of aesthetic judgements, their supposed autonomy. Roger
Scrutons aesthetic attitude theory provides us with the means to develop a plausible
quasi-realist account of aesthetic judgement.
Pragmatism, Quasi-realism and the Global
Expressivism is typically a local view. An expressivist about moral or aesthetic judgments
will contrast these judgments to genuinely descriptive claims.
Minimalism versus Quasi-Realism: Why The Minimalist Has A Dialectical Advantage
Alan Thomas, King's College, London.
Minimalist and quasi-realist approaches to problematic
discourses such as the causal, moral and modal are compared and contrasted. While
quasi-realism can meet the challenge of reconstructing a logic of "commitment"
to cover both "projected" and "detected" discourses, it can do so at
an unacceptable cost. Thus, quasi-realism fails to meet its own standards for theory
acceptance. Minimalism and quasi-realism, in their approaches to such problematic areas of
discourse as the modal, the moral and the causal. The two theories are very similar. Both
are opposed to "quietistic" stances towards realism.
Fictionalism, Quasi-Realism and the Question of Right - Michael Hicks,
Johns Hopkins University.
I argue that fictionalism about abstracta is a well-motivated anti-realist response to
Blackburns question of right, but one that ultimately fails. The fictionalist
herself ends up a subtle realist.
Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances
Edward Harcourt, Department of Philosophy, School of European Culture and Languages,
University of Kent.
The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics. A dilemma is posed for the
quasi-realist. Either ethical discourse appears to express representational states, or
else there is no such thing as its appearing to express such states.
Quasi-realism, sensibility theory, and ethical relativism = Le quasi-réalisme, la
théorie de la sensibilité et le relativisme éthique - KIRCHIN Simon,
University of Sheffield, ROYAUME-UNI.
Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism, quasi-realist projectivism,
can evade the threat of ethical relativism. Sensibility theorists can counter ethical
relativism in much the same way that quasi-realist projectivists can.
Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem - Nicholas Unwin,
An essential part of Blackburn's 'quasi-realist project', showing how we can earn the
right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a
Quasi-realism and Relativism
A. W. Moore, St. Hugh's College
QUASI-REALISM IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY - From An interview with SIMON
BLACKBURN - By Darlei Dall´Agnol
You have been developing a metaphysical program known as quasi-realism. How
would you explain it in a few words to our readers?
The easiest way to understand my program is if we look back to people like A. J. Ayer,
Language, truth and logic, Charles Stevenson, Ethics and language, and the expressivist or
emotivist traditions in ethics.
Essays in Quasi-Realism
Simon Blackburn explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems:
the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism.
The figure of the "quasi-realist" dramatizes the difficulty of conducting these
debates. The quasi-realist challenge is that we can have attachments without any
metaphysic that deserves to be called realism.