|
The belief that all sociological explanations can be
reduced to characteristics of individuals who make up the society.
This position is also
known as psychologism: explaining social phenomenon in terms of the
psychological dispositions of members of society.
This is a rejection of
macro-structuralists working in the tradition of Emile Durkheim or Karl Marx who assumed
that the characteristics of individuals need not be considered.
They argued that social
facts (society) had an existence of their own and that it was these which sociologists
were interested in.
THE CHANGING FACE OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
Lars Udehn Department of Social Sciences, Mälardalen University, P.O. Box 325,
SE-631 05 Eskilstuna, Sweden; e-mail: lars.udehn@mdh.se
Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 28: 479-507 (Volume publication date August 2002)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140938)
It is common to categorize social scientific theories as either individualistic or
holistic, and to assume that they are opposites. This neat picture is not so much wrong as
too simple. There are different versions of both doctrines, and some versions combine
elements from both. In this article I distinguish a number of versions of methodological
individualism that differ significantly in strength. The main divide is between strong
versions of methodological individualism, which suggest that all social phenomena should
be explained only in terms of individuals and their interaction, and weak versions of
methodological individualism, which also assign an important role to social institutions
and/or social structure in social science explanations. -
arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140938
Methodological Individualism, Explanation, and Invariance
Daniel Steel, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 36, No. 4, 440-463 (2006) DOI:
10.1177/0048393106293455 © 2006 SAGE Publications
This article examines methodological individualism in terms of the theory that invariance
under intervention is the signal feature of generalizations that serve as a basis for
causal explanation. This theory supports the holist contention that macro-level
generalizations can explain, but it also suggests a defense of methodological
individualism on the grounds that greater range of invariance under intervention entails
deeper explanation. Although this individualist position is not threatened by
multiple-realizability, an argument for it based on rational choice theory is called into
question by experimental results concerning preference reversals. -
pos.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/440
Ho, D. Y. F. (1991). Relational orientation and methodological individualism.
Bulletin of the Hong Kong Psychological Society, Nos. 26/27, 81-95.
Relational Orientation and Methodological Individualism
Abstract: The present essay represents an attempt to weave two seemingly unrelated strands
of inquiry together. The first concerns the search for a conceptual framework grounded in
Asian cultures; the second concerns the nature of scientific explanations of social
phenomena. These two strands of inquiry converge to support the thesis of relational
orientation--that social behavior invariably takes place in relational contexts,
regardless of social class or cultural variations; and that, accordingly, the unit of
analysis is not the individual, but individual-in-relations. Relational orientation
confronts the bias toward methodological individualism in contemporary mainstream social
psychology. More generally, it provides a comprehensive framework for the
conceptualization and analysis of social phenomena. - humiliationstudies.org
An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in
Cognitive Rhetoric
Alban Bouvier
University of Paris-Sorbonne
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 32, No. 1, 51-70 (2002) © 2002 SAGE Publications
Some current attempts to go beyond the narrow scope of rational choice theory (RCT) in the
social sciences and the artificial reconstructions it sometimes provides focus on the
arguments that people give to justify their beliefs and behaviors themselves. But the
available argumentation theories are not constructed to fill this gap. This article argues
that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks. This provocative idea
requires a rereading of Sperber and Wilson's theory. Actually, the authors do not
explicitly support RCT, and Sperber has even strongly criticized methodological
individualism, which most of the time underlies RCT, in favor of infra-individualism. A
key point of the argument presented here is to show that Sperber and Wilson do not firmly
distinguish between infra-individualism and subintentionality. Only subintentionality is
needed. - pos.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/1/51
The Principle of Methodological Individualism and Marxian Epistemology - Joachim
Israel, University of Copenhagen
Acta Sociologica, Vol. 14, No. 3, 145-150 (1971) DOI: 10.1177/000169937101400301 © 1971
Scandinavian Sociological Association
In the following article I am going to defend the thesis, which at first may appear to be
strange, that, in order to base sociology (and knowledge) on Marxian epistemology one has
to accept on an ontological level the position of methodological individualism, and on a
metatheoretical level a position of non-reductionism 1.
In order to support my thesis I have to explicate briefly: 1) Marx's basic epistomological
position. 2) the principle of methodological individualism, where I try to differentiate
between a reified and a nonreified version2, and 3) the position of non-reductionism. -
asj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/14/3/145
Reconciling Group Selection and Methodological Individualism
TODD J. ZYWICKI
George Mason University - School of Law
Abstract: Methodological individualism underpins economic analysis. In his paper in this
volume, however, Douglas Glen Whitman demonstrates that group selection can be reconciled
with methodological individualism. This essay extends Whitman's analysis in two ways.
First, it summarizes and restates the necessary conditions for group selection to play a
role in the evolution of human preferences and societies. Second, it discusses the role of
group selection in Hayek's thought, with a particular focus on the role of group selection
in the evolution of legal rules and the rule of law. The viability of group selection is
demonstrated to be an empirical question. -
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=524402
Methodological individualism, economic behaviour and economic policy
Author: Papanikos G.T.
Source: International Journal of Social Economics, Volume 25, Number 9, 1998, pp.
1342-1352(11)
Abstract: This paper examines Hayeks version of methodological individualism in
relation to individual economic actions and economic effectiveness (social actions).
According to this approach, economic and social order is determined by the myriad
atomistic actions that are the result of individual planning taking into consideration the
idiosyncratic nature of knowledge. Economic policy is a form of social planning which is
not only ineffective but also has cataclysmic long-lasting effects, creating a disorder in
the market system. Two arguments are made in this study. First, methodological
individualism should be considered and be accepted as a serous attempt to explain
atomistic (economic) behaviour as purposeful actions constrained by scarce resources and
limited knowledge. Second, Hayeks strong version of methodological individualism is
very simplistic as it is applied to economic policy issues, contradicting his argument in
support of a methodological dualism. -
ingentaconnect.com/content/mcb/006/1998/00000025/00000009/art00002
Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice in Neoclassical Economics: An
Institutionalist Critique
Darley Jose
AbstractThis review paper is an attempt to take a critical look at methodological
individualism and rational choice that form the hard core of neoclassical economics, from
an institutionalist perspective. I try to establish that methodological individualism is a
project of reductionism, by discussing reductionism in the context of social sciences, and
by analysing methodological individualism in the context of neoclassical economics.
Philosophical and institutionalist critiques are then employed to elucidate that
methodological individualism as practised in neoclassical economics is not capable of
explaining real world phenomena, especially that of the predominantly traditional
societies of the developing countries. The rational choice theory as espoused in
neoclassical economics is also discussed and I have tried to build an institutionalist
critique from the perspectives of various strands of institutionalisms in economics. The
neo-institutionalism and new institutionlism, though some relaxation of the axioms has
been attempted, still uphold the neoclassical maxims of methodological individualism and
rational choice. The approach of the alternative institutionalist school which attempts to
explain individual agency as influenced by the social as well as institutional contexts
seems more suitable to explain real world phenomena. -
umb.no/noragric/publications/workingpapers/noragric-wp-28_abstract.pdf
Methodological individualism, cognitive homogeneity and environmental determinism
Clark A.
Source: Journal of Economic Methodology, Volume 10, Number 1, March 2003, pp. 79-85(7)
Abstract: A study encompassing a number of UK Universities identified a widespread
implicit environmental determinism employed in the teaching of Economics to business
studies undergraduates. In this paper the author argues that this bias is an inevitable
by-product of the methodological individualism adopted within mainstream economics. The
author concludes that methodological individualism is, therefore, flawed both as a
mechanism for accessing the reality of the business world and the power of firms within
it, and for teaching others about that reality, particularly as it also acts to undermine
student motivation. - ingentaconnect.com
Some Notes on Methodological Individualism: Orthodox and Heterodox Views
ANDY DENIS, The City University London
October 9, 2006
Abstract: 'Methodological individualism' (MI) is often invoked as a fundamental
description of the methodology both of neoclassical and Austrian economics, as well as
other approaches, from New Keynesianism to analytical Marxism. Yet there is considerable
controversy as to what the phrase means. Moreover, the methodologies of those to whom the
theoretical practice of MI is ascribed differ profoundly on the status of the individual
economic agent: economics, according to Friedman (1962), is based in the study of 'a
number of independent households, a collection of Robinson Crusoes', while for Hayek
(1979), 'individuals are merely the foci in the network of relationships'. The one sees
individuals as a congeries of isolated atoms, the other as constituted by their mutual
relationships. Starting from a recent discussion on the History of Economics Societies
email discussion list, the present paper attempts to begin that task of teasing apart some
of the issues involved in making sense of the concept of MI. It is argued that at least
three distinct polarities are generally conflated in the critique and defence of MI:
holism versus reductionism, materialism versus idealism, and top-down versus bottom-up
thinking. The paper suggests that clarifying these issues allows us to see a continuity in
the methodology of heterodox economics, including Marxist, Austrian, Institutionalist and
Post-Keynesian economics, standing in marked contrast to that of orthodox, neoclassical
schools, such as Keynesianism, monetarism, new classical macroeconomics and analytical
Marxism. - papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947260 |
|