Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is shared understanding that helps us relate one situation to another.

Sociologists who reject the assumption of the objective nature of social reality and focus on the subjective experience of actors have to avoid the fallacy of reducing the world only to personal experience.

The concept of intersubjectivity achieves this: ordinary people as well as sociologists assume that if another stood in their shoes they would see the same things. We all constantly make our subjective experience available and understandable by others as well.

Intersubjectivity is, at its simplest, shared understanding that helps us relate one situation to another. It implies that students and instructors each have attendant responsibilities; students are tasked with discovering how to build knowledge and manage their learning, and instructors are tasked with guiding students in these processes. Article focuses on the ways that emerging technologies foster intersubjectivity within graduate level courses and programmes. Student data are interspersed to help depict the critical nature, in terms of intersubjectivity, of interface design, instructor interventions and tool selection and use in developing community and shared knowledge within the online learning environment. - Intersubjectivity: Facilitating Knowledge Construction in Online Environments - Bober M. J.; Dennen V.P.

Patterns of Intersubjectivity in the Constitution of Subjectivity: Dimensions of Otherness 
Nelson Ernesto Coelho, Jr., University of São Paulo, Brazil, patnelco@uol.com.br 
Luís Claudio Figueiredo, University of São Paulo, Brazil, lclaudio@netpoint.com.br 
Culture & Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 3, 193-208 (2003) © 2003 SAGE Publications
This article presents a new characterization of the concept and experience of intersubjectivity based on four matrices that we see as organizing and elucidating different dimensions of otherness. The four matrices are described through key references to their proponents in the fields of philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis: (1) trans-subjective intersubjectivity (Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty); (2) traumatic intersubjectivity (Levinas); (3) interpersonal intersubjectivity (Mead); and (4) intrapsychic intersubjectivity (Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott). These intersubjective dimensions are understood as indicating dimensions of otherness that never occupy the field of human experience in a pure, exclusive form.

Psychoanalysis, Epistemology and Intersubjectivity 
Theories of Wilfred Bion 
John R. Maze, University of Sydney 
Rachael M. Henry, University of Wollongong 
Theory & Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 3, 401-421 (1996) © 1996 SAGE Publications
The inference to other minds by analogy with one's own is unconvincing, yet all our social interactions assume we can identify others' beliefs and intentions. The problem is acute for psychoanalysis as it is especially concerned with unconscious mental processes. W.R. Bion offered recommendations for true psychoanalytic knowledge, and concepts such as projective identification and counter-transference are related. Bion's special study was of psychotic thought. His explanation of its underlying mechanism was in terms of a breakdown in cognitive processing at the transition from sensory impressions to conceptual thought, an epistemology familiar in academic processing theories. Conceptual difficulties in such theories are discussed.

Projective Identification and Intersubjectivity 
Michael A. Forrester, University of Kent 
Theory & Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 6, 783-802 (2006) © 2006 SAGE Publications
The issue of what might constitute intersubjective relations during infancy and early childhood remains something of a puzzle within and beyond psychology. This paper considers whether the psychoanalytic concept of projective identification might supplement or enrich theoretical efforts in this domain. Following introductory comments on distinctive characteristics of Merleau-Ponty’s commentary on intersubjectivity, attention turns to psychoanalytic assumptions and presuppositions underpinning projective identification. Complementary and contrastive themes are drawn out, specifically those which highlight alternative metaphysical positions taken up within these approaches. Discussion touches on the processes involved in the emergence of projective identification and what implications the concept may have for contemporary theories of intersubjectivity in developmental psychology.

Constitution of the Self: Intersubjectivity and Dialogicality 
Ivana Marková, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK, ivana.markova@stir.ac.uk 
Culture & Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 3, 249-259 (2003) © 2003 SAGE Publications
The polysemic nature of intersubjectivity stems not only from diverse pursuits and goals but also from different ontologies of intersubjectivity. More specifically, the four matrices described by Coelho and Figueiredo (2003) imply two ontologies: `I-Other(s)' and `I' versus `Other(s)'. These ontologies lead to different concepts of communication. In the former case, communication is based on the idea of attunement and fusion of the minds. In the latter case, communication seems to be either determined a priori as a moral principle or managed monologically. Despite essential differences between the two ontologies, they both aim at the reduction of diverse positions of the self and other(s). It is argued that intersubjectivity that aims at fusion with the other is too narrow to account for the constitution of subjectivity. Instead, dialogicality, that is, the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of the `Alter`, must complement intersubjectivity in conceptualizations of subjectivity. Living in the world of others presupposes that co-authors not only attempt to reduce their differences in communication but also that they acknowledge one another as co-authors of their ideas; they dispute and fight about ideas; and they also confirm their participation in social realities.

Intersubjectivity and Temporal Reference in Television Commentary 
Stephanie Marriott 
Time & Society, Vol. 4, No. 3, 345-364 (1995) © 1995 SAGE Publications
In this article it is argued that television commentary gives rise to an electronically mediated intersubjectivity at the level of the speaker and hearer's spatio-temporal perspectives on the world. The linguistic structures which occur as a result of this mutual cognitive environment are discussed, with particular reference to the ostensive use of demonstrative expressions to indicate intersubjectively established elements.

The Achievement of Intersubjectivity through Embodied Completions: A Study of Interactions Between First and Second Language Speakers 
Junko Mori, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Makoto Hayashi, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Applied Linguistics 2006 27(2):195-219; © Oxford University Press 2006 
This study examines casual interactions between first language (L1) and second language (L2) speakers of Japanese, paying special attention to the coordination of vocal and non-vocal resources that are brought to bear on the achievement of intersubjectivity. More specifically, this study investigates a practice of ‘embodied completion’ (Olsher 2004), namely the practice of deploying a partial turn of talk that offers a projectable trajectory of ongoing action and completing that action with a gesture or other embodied display. The participants’ conduct that precedes this embodied completion reveals the local processes used to evaluate, discover, and establish shared linguistic and non-linguistic resources in pursuing intersubjectivity. Further, the sequence of actions that follows the embodied completion provides an incidental, interactionally motivated opportunity for the L1 speaker to reformulate what the L2 speaker has said with a more sophisticated linguistic expression.

Intersubjectivity – interactionist or discursive? Reflections on Habermas’ critique of Brandom 
Piet Strydom, Department of Sociology, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 2, 155-172 (2006) © 2006 SAGE Publications
This article argues that there is a marked ambivalence in Habermas’ concept of intersubjectivity in that he wavers between an interactionist and a discursive understanding. This ambivalence is demonstrated with reference to his recent critique of Robert Brandom's normative pragmatic theory of discursive practice. Although Habermas is a leading theorist of discourse as an epistemically steered process, he allows his interpretation of Brandom's theory as suffering from objective idealism to compel him to recoil from discourse and to defend a purely interactionist or dialogical position. It is argued that the ambivalence in question is related to Habermas’ incomplete theorization of communication as a process of structure formation that unfolds sequentially through time on different levels. His architectonic of communicative intersubjectivity is marred by a missing concept.

Reconciling communicative action with recognition 
thickening the ‘inter’ of intersubjectivity 
Eva Erman, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 3, 377-400 (2006) © 2006 SAGE Publications
There is an underlying idea of symmetry involved in most notions of rationality. From a dialogical philosophical standpoint, however, the symmetry implied by social contract theories and so-called Golden Rule thinking is anchored to a Cartesian subject–object world and is therefore not equipped to address recognition – at least not if recognition is to be understood as something happening between subjects. For this purpose, the dialogical symmetry implied by Habermas' communicative action does a much better job. Still, it is insufficient to embrace those kinds of recognition that are dependent on asymmetry and concrete difference. This article explores how communicative action could meet the demand of recognition by investigating a complementary source of validity in communicative rationality, apart from Habermas' validity claims, in which ‘inter’ is better characterized as mutuality than as symmetry.

Feeling Gender Speak - Intersubjectivity and Fieldwork Practice with Women Who Prostitute in Lima, Peru 
Lorraine Nencel, De Vrije Universiteit, LS.Nencel@fsw.vu.nl 
European Journal of Women's Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, (2005) © 2005 SAGE Publications
This article discusses a dimension of fieldwork methodology often overlooked. It concerns the act of feeling (inferences) and how this subjective ability contributes to understanding cultural meanings, which are unspoken or encoded in dialogue, but remain unarticulated. The discovery of this dimension in fieldwork eventually brought several epistemological principles into question pertaining to power and intersubjectivity subscribed to in a feminist or critical anthropology. Simultaneously, the use of this dimension in fieldwork gave insight into the relational construction of gender identity - the author’s own, that of the women and a male assistant.

The ontological co-emergence of 'self and other' in Japanese philosophy
Yoko Arisaka, Philosophy Department, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton St., San Francisco, CA 94117, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 197-208 
Abstracts: The coupling of 'self and other' as well as the issues regarding intersubjectivity have been central topics in modern Japanese philosophy. The dominant views are critical of the Cartesian formulation (pure, disembodied subjectivity), but the Japanese philosophers drew their conclusions also based on their own insights into Japanese culture and language. In this paper I would like to explore this theme in two of the leading modern Japanese philosophers - Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945) and Tetsuro Watsuji (1889-1960). I do not make a causal claim that Japanese culture or language was responsible for these thinkers' philosophy, although without a doubt they were strong influences. The point rather is to show an interesting convergence of concerns regarding the fundamental nature of the relation between the self and others across different cultures and intellectual traditions, and to clarify further the ontological structure of the self-other relation. After the examination, the thesis I would like to defend here is the following: Intersubjectivity is indeed a condition, rather than an accident, of the structure of lived experiences as such (not 'consciousness') but this relation also requires at the same time the recognition that the Other must remain a true negation-in-relation to the self. Let me first turn to Watsuji, although chronologically he was 20 years junior and was a student of Nishida, since Watsuji's phenomenology deals more directly with the topic of intersubjectivity. I will then turn to Nishida's broader ontological considerations. 

The Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity as alterology. emergent theories and wisdom traditions in the light of genetic phenomenology
Natalie Depraz, College International de Philosophie, University of Sorbonne, Paris, France
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 169-78 
Abstracts: In this paper, I have a twofold aim: First I wish to show to what extent the Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity can be relevant for contemporary empirical research and for ancestral wisdom traditions, both in their experiences and in their conceptual tools; and secondly I intend to rely on some empirical results and experiential mystical/practical reports in order to bring about some more refined phenomenological descriptions first provided by Husserl. The first aim will be the main concern here, while the second will only be broached by way of initial steps towards further development. 
I will proceed in two stages: in the first place I will give some evidence for Husserl's relevance by giving an account of his original conceptions of (a) egoic subjectivity, (b) genetic phenomenology, and (c) lived empathy. In the second place, my purpose is to indicate how much Husserl's view on infants/children, animals/ beasts, mad people/the insane and aliens/foreigners/strangers may be of some interest for scientific empirical conceptions and for practical paths of spiritual self-development. In so doing, I hope to be able (1) to confirm the accuracy of Husserl's own intuitions and analysis, and (2) to suggest some refinements in the way Husserl described such experiences. 
Throughout this paper I will focus on two main Husserlian discoveries: (1) subjectivity is from the very start intersubjectivity; (2) infants, animals, the insane and aliens are subjects in a full sense, precisely because they are from the very beginning always already intersubjective subjects; besides, they are limit-subjectivities, who compel me in a kind of feedback to enlarge and to deepen my own subjectivity. 

The practice of mind. theory, simulation or primary interaction?
Shaun Gallagher, Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY 14208, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 83-108 
Abstracts: Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person's mental states and behaviours. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about second-person interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another's behaviour. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive means for understanding other persons, go beyond both the phenomenological and the scientific evidence. I argue that the interpretation of 'primary intersubjectivity' as merely precursory to theory of mind is inadequate. Rather, primary intersubjectivity, understood as a set of embodied practices and capabilities, is not only primary in a developmental sense, but is the primary way we continue to understand others in second-person interactions. 

Burnout and intersubjectivity: A psychoanalytical study from a Lacanian perspective 
Stijn Vanheule, Ghent University, Belgium 
An Lievrouw, Ghent University, Belgium 
Paul Verhaeghe, Ghent University, Belgium 
Human Relations, Vol. 56, No. 3, 321-338 (2003) DOI: 10.1177/0018726703056003614 © 2003 The Tavistock Institute
This article examines the intersubjective process connected with burnout. On the basis of qualitative research data we investigate to what extent Lacan's model of intersubjectivity enables us to understand the burnout process and to differentiate between people who suffer from burnout and those who do not. We first outline Lacan's theory of intersubjectivity through a discussion of the dialectical master/slave relationship and the difference between imaginary and symbolic interactions. This model is then tested against the interview material of 30 special educators drawn from the results of a wider random sample survey of 765 respondents in response to a burnout questionnaire.

The 'shared manifold' hypothesis. From mirror neurons to empathy
Vittorio Gallese, Istituto di Fisiologia Umana, Universita di Parma, Via Volturno 39, I-43100 Parma, Italy
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 33-50 
Abstracts: My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action (see Gallese, 2000b), as between the agent of the action and his/her observer (see below). Agency constitutes a key issue for the understanding of intersubjectivity and for explaining how individuals can interpret their social world. This account of intersubjectivity, founded on the empirical findings of neuroscientific investigation, will be discussed and put in relation with a classical tenet of phenomenology: empathy. I will provide an 'enlarged' account of empathy that will be defined by means of a new conceptual tool: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. 

Understanding the representational mind. A prerequisite for intersubjectivity proper
Iso Kern, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Laenggasstra. 49A, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland
Eduard Marbach, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Laenggasstra. 49A, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 69-82 
Abstracts: This paper argues that, from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy, the study of intersubjectivity is closely tied to questions of the representational mind. It focuses on developmental studies of children's understanding of the human mind, setting out some of the main findings and theoretical explanations. It then takes up Husserl's idea of looking at persons in the 'personal attitude'. Understanding motivational connections among a person's subjective experiences is an essential feature of this attitude.

A Philosopher Manqué? Simone de Beauvoir, Moral Value and 'The Useless Mouths' 
Elizabeth Stanley, University of Manchester, UK 
European Journal of Women's Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 201-220 (2001) © 2001 SAGE Publications
In discussing Simone de Beauvoir's ontological ethics in an earlier article in this journal, the author suggested in passing that she could be seen as a 'philosopher manqué', a 'lost' or 'missed' philosopher, a woman who gave up or rejected philosophy to pursue ideas by better means for her purposes. Here the author explores the idea of de Beauvoir as a philosopher manqué in relation to her play Les Bouches inutiles, using a translation-in-progress into English, The Useless Mouths, to examine ideas about morality, ethics and intersubjectivity expressed within it. De Beauvoir constructs characters around different philosophical positions, which are evaluated by reference to the play's unfolding action.

Scandalous ethics. Infinite presence with suffering
Annabella Pitkin, Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 231-46 
Abstracts: I want to argue here that certain Buddhist and Jewish thinkers say scandalous things on purpose. More scandalously still, I suggest that these statements are infused with deeply transformative ethical power, intended specifically as a way of relating to the dreadful fact of suffering. As scandals, these special responses to suffering intentionally rupture normal semantic patterns and sequences of thought, often through statements or actions which appear paradoxical. These scandalous statements are, in fact, always communicative in function, structure, and intent, but they are designed to create a kind of 'cognitive dissonance'. The thinkers I consider here say scandalous things in order to cause a breaking-open in the consciousness of the hearer and practitioner, which produces compassion, transformation, and liberation. Counter-intuitively, this rupture highlights intersubjectivity and language. 

Matrix and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenological Aspects of Group Analysis 
Hans W. Cohn, School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, Regent's College, London 
Group Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 4, 481-486 (1993) DOI: 10.1177/0533316493264008 © 1993 The Group-Analytic Society
In the course of this century there has been a shit from a view of man as a self-contained structured entity, open to outside influences but clearly set off against the rest of the world, to a perspective from which man is seen as being-in-the-world-with-others, a world to which man is inseparably linked. This change of perspective shows itself in philosophy in a move from an extreme subjectivism (which in 1943 still pervaded Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness) to a complete dismissal of the subject (as proposed, for instance, by Michel Foucault). Similarly in psychotherapy, the move has been from the self-centred individualistic approaches of various forms of psychoanalysis to certain types of family therapy where the subject seems completely absorbed by the `system'. In this development, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and S.H. Foulkes hold a half-way position. They do not abandon the notion of a subject but open it up and decentre it. `Meaning and significance', to use Foulkes's words, rest o longer within the subject but between subjects. Matrix and intersubjectivity are the relevant fields of experience.

Encounters with animal minds
Barbara Smuts, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 525 East University, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1109, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 293-309 
Abstracts: In this article I draw on personal experience to explore the kinds of relationships that can develop between human and nonhuman animals. The first part of the article describes my encounters with wild baboons, whom I studied in East Africa over the course of many years. The baboons treated me as a social being, and to gain their trust I had to learn the troop's social conventions and behave in accordance with them. This process gave me a feeling for what it means to be a baboon. Over time, I developed a sense of belonging to their community, and my subjective identity seemed to merge with theirs. This experience expanded my sense of the possible in interspecies relations. The second part of the article describes a mutual exploration of such possibilities in my relationship with my dog, Safi. I describe how Safi and I co-create systems of communication and emotional expression that permit deep 'intersubjectivity', despite our very different biological natures. In my relationships with baboons, dogs, and other animals, I have encountered the presence in another of something resembling a human 'self'. I emphasize the importance of recognizing and honoring this presence in other animals as well as in humans. 

Empathy and consciousness
Evan Thompson, Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 1-32 
Abstracts: This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, understood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondition (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy is inherently developmental: open to it are pathways to non-egocentric or self-transcendent modes of intersubjectivity. (5) Real progress in the understanding of intersubjectivity requires integrating the methods and findings of cognitive science, phenomenology, and contemplative and meditative psychologies of human transformation. 

Holding in Mind: Intersubjectivity, Subject Relations and the Group 
Phil Schulte, NHS psychotherapy service in Bexley, Kent 
Group Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4, 531-544 (2000) DOI: 10.1177/05333160022077434 © 2000 The Group-Analytic Society
Intersubjectivity, the intersection of two (or more) subjectivities, is emerging as a key concept in psychoanalysis. The intersubjective perspective stands in contrast to classical psychoanalytic theorizing and implies that much current thinking about subjectivity and objectivity needs revisiting. Views on subjectivity within philosophy, developmental psychology and psychoanalysis have much to offer group analysis (and, one suspects, vice versa). The everyday assumption that our subjectivity is essentially private is challenged.

Intersubjectivity in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism
B. Alan Wallace, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3130, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 209-30 
Abstracts: This essay focuses on the theme of intersubjectivity, which is central to the entire Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition. It addresses the following five themes pertaining to Buddhist concepts of intersubjectivity: (1) the Buddhist practice of the cultivation of meditative quiescence challenges the hypothesis that individual human consciousness emerges solely from the dynamic interrelation of self and other; (2) the central Buddhist insight practice of the four applications of mindfulness is a means for gaining insight into the nature of oneself, others and the relation between oneself and the rest of the world, which provides a basis for cultivating a deep sense of empathy; (3) the Buddhist cultivation of the four immeasurables is expressly designed to arouse a rich sense of empathy with others; (4) the meditative practice of dream yoga, which illuminates the dream-like nature of waking reality is shown to have deep implications regarding the nature of intersubjectivity; (5) the theory and practice of Dzogchen, the 'great perfection' system of meditation, challenges the assertion of the existence of an inherently real, localized, ego-centred mind, as well as the dichotomy of objective space as opposed to perceptual space. 

The Politics of Problems: Intersubjectivity in Defining Powerful Others 
Sue Jones, University of Bath 
Human Relations, Vol. 37, No. 11, 881-894 (1984) DOI: 10.1177/001872678403701101 © 1984 The Tavistock Institute
This paper is concerned with how persons in organizations, tackling what they define as complex problems, define others as significant in terms of their perceived power. Using a particular case as an illustration, the author argues for attending to the complex intersubjectivity of definitions of; powerful others, involving not only patterns and consensualities but also significant diversity in the theories and values different individuals bring to understanding and predicting their political environments and the key actors within them.

Beyond empathy. Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity
Dan Zahavi, Danish Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, Vimmelskaftet 41A, 2, DK-1161 Copenhagen K, Denmark
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 151-67 
Abstracts: Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler's criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a 'solution' to the 'traditional' problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn't merely concern concrete face-to-face encounters between individuals. It is also something that is at play in simple perception, in tool-use, in emotions, drives and different types of self-awareness. Ultimately, the phenomenologists would argue that a treatment of intersubjectivity requires a simultaneous analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and world. It is not possible simply to insert intersubjectivity somewhere within an already established ontology; rather, the three regions 'self', 'others', and 'world' belong together; they reciprocally illuminate one another, and can only be understood in their interconnection. 

From intersubjectivity to intercorporeality: contributions of a phenomenological philosophy to the psychological study of alterity. Psicol. USP, 2003, vol.14, no.1, p.185-209. ISSN 0103-6564. 
COELHO JUNIOR, Nelson Ernesto. 
Abstract: This paper presents the philosophical questioning of intersubjectivity in the phenomenological theories of Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty, considering their contribution to the constitution of psychological studies of alterity. It presents forms in which the other appears before me, its possible presence as a constitutive element of the world in which I take part, and above all, as a constitutive element of myself. In order to recognize the other in its radical alterity I cannot institute it by comparison with myself, by analogy or introjection and not even by processes of affective fusion. These forms exclude the possibility of recognizing the other in its difference. It is suggested that we have to start with a sensible/perceptive experience in the proper sphere of a lived body, so as to make it possible to recognize the other as difference in its expressive forms. As a conclusion, a favorable substitution of the notion of intersubjectivity by the one of intercorporeality is proposed. - scielo.br/

Paths of intersubjectivity: Ferenczi, Bion, Matte-Blanco. Psicol. USP, 1999, vol.10, no.1, p.141-155. ISSN 0103-6564. 
GERBER, Ignácio
Abstract: Intersubjectivity is pertinent to the freudian concept of Psychoanalysis. Yet, it was Ferenczi, his closest disciple, and the pioneer in the investigations of emotions, which come upon the analyst in the presence of the patient.

Sequentiality as a problem and resource for intersubjectivity in aphasic conversation: analysis and implications for therapy 
Wilkinson R.
Source: Aphasiology, Volume 13, Numbers 4-5, 1 April 1999, pp. 327-343(17)
Abstract: Investigations of non-aphasic conversation have displayed the importance of sequentiality in the meaning and understanding of utterances in conversation. Sequentiality refers to the way in which an utterance is constructed so as to display its relation to the immediately preceding utterances and to make expectable a certain type of utterance in the following turn. As such, it has been shown to be a central resource for participants in achieving intersubjectivity, or a state of mutual understanding, in conversation. In this paper, sequentiality in aphasic conversation is investigated. It is found that aphasia can disrupt the speaker s ability to display the sequential properties of utterances in conversation and can, therefore, be an important reason why certain aphasic turns can be difficult for hearers to understand. However, aphasic speakers are also shown to be able to use the sequential context of earlier turns as a resource to aid communication by referring deictically to prior utterances.

The Intersubjectivity of Interaction
John W. Du Bois, University of California, Santa Barbara
For some time now, students of language have been deeply aware that it is not enough to approach language simply as an objective means of referring to and predicating about states of affairs in the world. To rectify the prior preoccupation, we have lately been witnessing the rise of a new orientation to the subjectivity of language. The pursuit of a subjective component in language is now proceeding in earnest, with more and more of language undergoing reexamination in the new light. Still, there is reason to be concerned that the theoretical reevaluation so far conducted has not been as thorough as may yet be required. What is missing from the current revision, perhaps, is a full appreciation of the third element in the Kantian triad: that of intersubjectivity, whose role in language, in comparison to its objective and subjective dimensions, remains mysterious to many. As a first approximation, intersubjectivity can be glossed as: I define my subjectivity in relation to your subjectivity. 
As it turns out, the most compelling reason to take up the challenge of intersubjectivity comes, not from some urge to Kantian completeness, but from the evidence of interaction itself. In particular, stancetaking in conversation presents a number of patterns which seem to require an orientation to intersubjectivity, not only on the part of the analyst but also on the part of the participants. The present paper seeks to explore the role of intersubjectivity in stancetaking, focusing specifically on how participants orient to, as well as construct, a set of relations between the objective, the subjective, and the intersubjective. In coming to terms with this triadic relationship I seek to theoretically ground a phenomenal structure which is foundational to the organization of interaction, cognition, discourse, language, and culture. I undertake to demonstrate that intersubjectivity, far from being a mere philosopher’s preoccupation, is a direct, pervasive, tangible, and compelling concern for all participants in dialogic interaction.
Why is it necessary to integrate intersubjectivity into any understanding of language and social life? A purely objective perspective on the world and our place in it notoriously underestimates the variability between subjects in their perceiving, interpreting, and speaking about the world. A purely subjective perspective suffers detachment from reality. The pursuit of an intersubjective perspective, in contrast, seeks to escape this dilemma by requiring speakers of a common language to submit their subjective interpretations of the world to a process of comparison and calibration with the subjective interpretations of others who participate in the same world, the same speech community, the same discourse. Intersubjectivity builds a sociocognitive framework for approaching agreement that strives to transcend the limits of the individual subject, thereby evading the twin pitfalls of isolated subjectivity and inert objectivity. 
How does intersubjectivity relate to stance? I argue that stance should be analyzed as a triplex act, in which the stancetaker simultaneously evaluates an object, positions a subject (the self), and aligns with other subjects. Frequently, participants construct their stance in relation to a stance just voiced by another participant. In other words, participants construct stances out of what is already on the conversational table. This process of stance inflection turns out to be a pervasive and more or less continuously calibrated process by which conversational participants collaborate to arrive at a new, emergent stance. The newly inflected stance may either converge to, or diverge from, the prior stance. The dialogic structure of the whole process invites comparison between the two stances, leading participants to calculate the stance differential: the difference between your stance and my stance. A continual orientation to this gap, whether large or small, blatant or finely nuanced, is fundamental to participants’ experience of their intersubjective relation to their dialogic co-participants.
On the theoretical level, I present a dialogic model of stance and intersubjectivity, positing a triangular structure for the stance act in order to account for recurrent patterns in the organization of stancetaking, and for the pervasive orientation to objective, subjective, and intersubjective dimensions of stance. Examples are drawn from conversations in the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English. - ruf.rice.edu/~reng/rls10abstracts/dubois.html

Labour and Intersubjectivity: Notes on the Natural Law of Copyright
ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, University of Toronto - Faculty of Law 
Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum Paper No. 01-06 and U of Toronto, Public Law Research Paper No. 01-06 
Abstract: The paper develops a theoretical approach to copyright law centred on authorial right, yet capable of accounting for the public interest in access to and dissemination of intellectual creations. The paper questions the deployment of Locke's labour theory of property in the formulation of a rights-based view of copyright, and offers a rights-based interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy inspired by Kant's theory of property. Whereas Locke understood the property right in terms of the category of labour, Kant posited that, as a relation between persons, the property right cannot be derived from a unilateral act - such as labour - of a person on a thing. Deploying the interpersonal dimension of the property right, the paper demonstrates that the idea/expression dichotomy normatively structures the relation between the parties to a copyright action in terms of their equal rights to authorship. To the extent that the defendant has not copied the plaintiff's expression but has instead expressed an idea anew, the defendant has exercised her own authorship. The limits of the plaintiff's right (i.e. the law's refusal to copyright ideas) are thus the contours of a public domain that, as a matter of equality, the plaintiff himself must be held to recognize. - papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275470

Grounding Signs of Culture: Primary Intersubjectivity in Social Semiosis
Stephen J. Cowley, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Bradford, UK, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
Sheshni Moodley, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Bradford, UK, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
Agnese Fiori-Cowley, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Bradford, UK, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
Mind, Culture, and Activity 2004, Vol. 11, No. 2, Pages 109-132 (doi:10.1207/s15327884mca1102_3)
Abstract: The article examines how infants are first permeated by culture. Building on Thibault (2000), semiogenesis is traced to the joint activity of primary intersubjectivity. Using an African example, analysis shows how--at 14 weeks--an infant already uses culturally specific indicators of "what a caregiver wants." Human predispositions and the mother's enactment of cultural processes enable the child to give joint activity a specific "sense." Developmentally, the child prods the caregiver to shaping his or her actions around social norms that transform the infant's world. This nascent lopsided relation is probably necessary for learning to talk. Acting with its mother, the baby's full-bodied activity uses adult "understanding" in ways that are cultural, contingent, and indexical. Infant activity is already semiotic. - leaonline.com

AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Carol Weaver, CAROL WEAVER was awarded an MA in Psychotherapy and Counselling by City University in 1998, having studied at Regent's College, London. She is now UKCP registered. She is a counsellor and psychotherapist for South Lincolnshire Healthcare, and an honorary therapist at the Edith Cavell Hospital in Peterborough.1CAROL WEAVER was awarded an MA in Psychotherapy and Counselling by City University in 1998, having studied at Regent's College, London. She is now UKCP registered. She is a counsellor and psychotherapist for South Lincolnshire Healthcare, and an honorary therapist at the Edith Cavell Hospital in Peterborough. 
Address for correspondence: 10 Fotheringhay, Peterborough PE8 5HZ. [e mail: CarolWeaver@compuserve.com]
ABSTRACT: Projective identification has been described as'the most fruitful psychoanalytic concept since the discovery of the unconscious' (Young 1994, p. 120). Many psychoanalysts, including Ogden, have also begun exploring the philosophical concept of intersubjectivity and how it may augment psychoanalytic understanding and practice. Existential psychotherapists include those who believe that intersubjectivity is the basic way in which humans relate. Diamond writes that'Without a notion of intersubjectivity, psychoanalysis is in difficulty, for it is impossible to envisage how feelings belonging to one individual pass into another' (Diamond 1998, p. 202).
After exploring the concept of projective identification and the claims from various contemporary psychoanalysts that this mechanism is interpersonal rather than purely intrapsychic, the paper explores the philosophical concept of intersubjectivity. The communication of emotion and the implications for therapy are then discussed, before conclusions are drawn about the relationship between the two concepts under examination. - blackwell-synergy.com

Considering the nature of intersubjectivity within professional nursing
Wanda Pierson RN MSN MA(Ed)1Doctoral Student, Simon Fraser University and Nursing Faculty, Langara College, Vancouver, Canada 
Correspondence to: Pierson Langara College, 100 West 49th Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V5Y 2Z6. E-mail: wpierson@langara.bc.ca
Abstract: The notion of intersubjectivity raises fundamental epistemological and ontological questions concerning how individuals come to know one another and how that knowing affects action. Within the sphere of professional nursing, relationship, as an intersubjective process between individuals, constitutes an integral element of professional nursing practice. Understanding the notion of relationship in terms of an intersubjective process is frequently laden with difficulty due to the polarization of intersubjectivity within either a traditional scientific position or a human science perspective. Reconciliation of both ways of knowing, however, may allow nurses to bring forward a broader base and scope of information to appreciate the experience of others. This article examines some of the notions of intersubjectivity and proposes an alternative understanding. - blackwell-synergy.com

Communication Media and Intersubjectivity in Small Groups
Shaila MirandaUniversity of Oklahomashailamiranda@ou.edu 
Robert P. BostromUniversity of Georgiabostrom@terry.uga.edu 
Leslie Jordan AlbertUniversity of Oklahomalesliealbert@ou.edu
ABSTRACT: Prior research suggests that computer-mediated communication (CMC) may impede groups’ intersubjective social construction of meaning. However, little is yet known about the intermediary processes that promote such intersubjectivity. Based on sociological and organizational theories of meaning and communication, we propose three such processes: signification, comprehension, and emotional contagion. 
In a laboratory experiment, findings provide preliminary support for the proposed salience of the three intermediary processes to intersubjectivity. The direct effect of CMC on intersubjectivity was initially negative. Following the addition of the three mediational processes, this effect was positive, though insignificant. Thus, the three intermediary processes collectively account for the negative effect of CMC on intersubjectivity. Specifically, results indicate that the effects of CMC on all three processes were negative and that signification and comprehension had positive effects on the intersubjective social construction of meaning. Implications of these findings for ongoing research on meaning in electronically-mediated communication are considered. - students.ou.edu/A/Leslie.J.Albert-1/ Intersubjectivity_abs.doc

Between Subjects: Shared Meanings of Intersubjectivity. 
Authors: Leadbeater, Bonnie J. 
Abstract: While the term "intersubjectivity" has become widely used to mean something like "shared experience," it is, paradoxically, poorly understood. This review of the theoretical foundations of intersubjectivity argues that the problem lies in the developmental starting points of the theories. Either subjective experiences are seen to develop before communal ones, as in Schutz (1967), or vice versa, as in Mead (1934). It is asserted that the polarity of these positions works against the understanding of the processes of intersubjectivity. Evidence from research on infants is used to suggest a new starting point that acknowledges both shared and private experience. - eric.ed.gov

Holding in Mind: Intersubjectivity, Subject Relations and the Group 
Phil Schulte, NHS psychotherapy service in Bexley, Kent 
Group Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4, 531-544 (2000) DOI: 10.1177/05333160022077434 © 2000 The Group-Analytic Society
Intersubjectivity, the intersection of two (or more) subjectivities, is emerging as a key concept in psychoanalysis. The intersubjective perspective stands in contrast to classical psychoanalytic theorizing and implies that much current thinking about subjectivity and objectivity needs revisiting. Views on subjectivity within philosophy, developmental psychology and psychoanalysis have much to offer group analysis (and, one suspects, vice versa). The everyday assumption that our subjectivity is essentially private is challenged. The article takes a fresh look at the notion of countertransference and emphasizes the group conductor's subjectivity as crucially constitutive of the group process. - intl-gaq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/4/531

Perverse Ethics - The Body, Gender and Intersubjectivity 
Lara Merlin, Rutgers University, lmerlin@hotmail.com 
Feminist Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, 165-178 (2003) DOI: 10.1177/14647001030042005 © 2003 SAGE Publications
This article explores the possibility of an ethical intersubjective relationship through the reconfiguration of the body. The violence of Western culture derives from a particular gendered fantasy of bodily organization. The Western body is constituted through a fear of lack and of loss, or, in psychoanalytic terms, of castration. The subject defined by castration attempts to defend itself against these dual threats by folding in upon itself, thereby precluding any relation with an other. The belief in lack and its partner, scarcity, informs the socio-political structures that mark the current era. However, there are other ways of imagining the body. By re-imagining the body, it becomes possible, not to avoid loss, but rather to alter its meaning. This act allows for a nonappropriative intersubjective relation to come into being. - intl-fty.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/4/2/165

Critique of Intersubjectivity
Abstract: The article investigates the philosophical/psychological notion of intersubjectivity and argues that our subjective involvement in each other, especially the psychoanalytic relation between analyst and analysand, ought to be regarded as an involvement on the unconscious level. The different notions of a joint conscious creation, or joint narrative, also implying a relative merger of our conscious personalities, could be harmful and are not likely to evoke a wholesome form of subjective engagement.- home.swipnet.se/~w-73784/intersubj.htm

Bayesian Intersubjectivity and Quantum Theory 
Pérez-Suárez, Marcos; Santos, David J. 
Abstract: Two of the major approaches to probability, namely, frequentism and (subjectivistic) Bayesian theory, are discussed, together with the replacement of frequentist objectivity for Bayesian intersubjectivity. This discussion is then expanded to Quantum Theory, as quantum states and operations can be seen as structural elements of a subjective nature. - adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2005AIPC..750..307P

Intersubjectivity within graduate level courses and programmes.