Demographic transition is the transformation of the structure of a population accompanying the change from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

The former society is characterized by high birth rates and high death rates, providing some stability to population size. Stability is also found in mature industrial societies with low death rates and low birth rates.

The demographic transition period typically involves declining death rates while birth rates remain high, leading to population growth.

Policy lessons of the East Asian demographic transition, McNicoll, Geoffrey. - Policy Research Division Working Paper no. 210. New York: Population Council. (PDF)
Lessons drawn from East Asia's striking experience of health and fertility transition concern the efficacy of well-designed government programs catering to an existing or ideationally stimulated demand. An alternative interpretation sees the demographic change—and the uptake of services—as a byproduct of social and economic development together with, in some cases, strong government pressures. The broad sequence entailed, initially, establishment of an effective, typically authoritarian, system of local administration, providing (sometimes incidentally) a framework for promotion and service delivery in health, education, and family planning. Subsequent economic liberalization offered new opportunities for upward mobility—and greater risks of backsliding—but along with erosion of social capital and the breakdown or privatization of service programs. The study is focused on seven countries: Taiwan and South Korea ("tiger" economies), Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China and Vietnam ("market-Leninist" economies). - popcouncil.org/publications/wp/prd/210.html

Bongaarts, John and Rodolfo A. Bulatao. "Completing the demographic transition," Policy Research Division Working Paper no. 125. New York: Population Council. (PDF)
Abstract: Despite ongoing declines in fertility in many countries, the population of the world is experiencing a period of rapid expansion, and its size is expected to exceed 10 billion by the end of the demographic transition. Three causes of this growth are identified and quantified: 1) fertility above the replacement level of two surviving children per woman, 2) continuing declines in mortality, and 3) population momentum resulting from a young age structure. A set of simple analytic expressions is proposed for estimating these factors from standard demographic indicators. Population momentum is shown to be the main cause of future growth in most countries and regions. - popcouncil.org/publications/wp/prd/125.html

An Assessment of the Demographic Transition in China
Jianjun Ji, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 105 Garfield Avenue. P.O. Box 4004, Eau Claire, WI 54702-4004, USA
Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1-25 (2003) © 2003 SAGE Publications
Many Chinese scholars hold the view that demographic transition in China has been completed. Some even argue that the country has already entered a "post-demographic transition period." Inspired by John R. Week’s reformulated perspective on demographic transition, this study examines China’s demographic transition with regard to five aspects: epidemiological transition, fertility transition, age transition, family transition, and urban transition. The results indicate that while the epidemiological transition and the fertility transition may well have been accomplished, the transitions in age structure, family, and urbanization have not. The study concludes that the demographic transition in China is not yet finished but still under way. Considering the country’s weak infrastructure in general and the overall low standard of living for the vast rural population in particular, China still faces severe challenges. Policy implications are discussed. - jds.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/1

Population Growth and the Demographic Transition in Kenya
Robert A. Wortham - International Sociology, Vol. 8, No. 2, 197-214 (1993) © 1993 International Sociological Association
This paper focuses on patterns of population growth in Kenya. The historical pattern of population growth from the close of the nineteenth century to 1992 is explored in the first two major sections. Estimates of the annual rate of natural population growth have not exceeded 2.5 per cent prior to 1960. Since 1960 the annual natural population growth rate has increased from 3 per cent in 1962 to 3.8-3.9 per cent for the 1977-1990 period. The rate has fallen slightly to 3.6 per cent for 1992, and data from the 1989 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey indicate that the total fertility rate declined significantly during the 1980s. The applicability of demographic transition theory to the study of population growth and development in Kenya is addressed in the third section. A fourstage model grounded in the work of Petersen, Caldwell and Chesnais is developed and applied to Kenya. Kenya is observed to have passed through the underdeveloped stage characterised by increasing birth and death rates and entered the transition/developing stage during the 1980s. Issues concerning the prospects of substantial continued reductions in the fertility level are addressed in the concluding section. - iss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/2/197

The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth
ODED GALOR, Brown University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Minerva Center for Economic Growth Working Paper No. 4-04
Abstract: The demographic transition that swept the world in the course of the last century has been identified as one of the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to growth. The unprecedented increase in population growth during the early stages of industrialization was ultimately reversed and the demographic transition brought about a significant reduction in fertility rates and population growth in various regions of the world, enabling economies to convert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress into growth of income per capita. This paper examines various mechanisms that have been proposed as possible triggers for the demographic transition, assessing their empirical validity, and their potential role in the transition from stagnation to growth. - papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=594521

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN EUROPE
George Hondroyiannis, Bank of Greece, Economic Research Department and Harokopio University, Evangelia Papapetrou, University of Athens and Bank of Greece, Economic Research Department
Abstract: Using panel cointegration analysis, we show that a cointegration relationship exists among fertility choice, infant mortality, real wages and real per capita output. The results suggest that in low mortality economies reductions in infant mortality will decrease fertility.
Most countries, industrialized or not, experience important demographic changes, one of the most important of which is the transition from a phase of rapid population growth to one in which population growth is low. Initially, a country experiences a mortality decline and fertility rises, both contributing to a rise in population growth. With some time lag, the reduction in mortality triggers a steady and continuous decline in fertility. This pattern is called the “demographic transition”. - economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2002/ volume10/EB-02J10001A.pdf

One explanation for the demographic transition in developing countries
Mukesh Eswaran, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia #997–1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1
This paper considers, in an overlapping generations model, the fertility choice of parents confronted with the possibility of child mortality. The motive for having children is assumed to be old age security and, therefore, not altruistic It is shown first in a partial equilibrium setting that reductions in child mortality can induce a demographic transition. In a general equilibrium setting, it is shown that a marginal reduction in child mortality can raise or lower the standard of living of the steady-state equilibrium population, depending on the initial level of child mortality. Finally the paper draws some relevant policy implications. - oep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/50/2/237

Demographic Transition in Asia and its Consequences
Authors: Hussain, Athar; Cassen, Robert; Dyson, Tim
Source: IDS Bulletin, Volume 37, Number 3, May 2006, pp. 79-87(9)
Abstract:: This article examines the dramatic demographic transition in Asia over the last five decades and its implications for education provision, social security and the environment. The speed and the current phase of the demographic shift vary greatly both between and within countries. East Asia, with its low population growth rate and fertility rate is in the final stages of the transition and South Asia, the converse. Despite Asia's falling population growth rate, by 2025 an extra 757 million people will be living in the region. The article highlights some of the main challenges for Asian countries over the coming years. These will include education provision (for countries with a high population growth rate and fertility rate), providing financially for an ageing population (for countries with a low fertility rate and low population growth) and addressing the problem of increased pressure on water supplies. - ingentaconnect.com

Epidemiologic and Demographic Transition: A Typology of Latin America and Caribbean Countries.
Author: Bacallao, Jorge
Source: Obesity and Poverty. A New Public Health Challenge, Obesity and Poverty. A New Public Health Challenge, pp. 77-84(8)
Abstract: In this chapter the author presents and interprets the results of an exploratory analysis of demographic and epidemiological indicators in 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries. The analysis is directed towards building a typology of countries that could be used to formulate a strategy for researching the trends and determinants of changes in health profiles. - ingentaconnect.com

RECENT TRENDS IN FIRST MARRIAGE IN RUSSIA: RETARDED SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
Sergei V. ZAKHAROV, Center for Demography and Human Ecology Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow)
In Russia, marriage remained early and universal over the 20th century. By the 1990s, mean age at first marriage was the same as in the second half of the 19th century. The traditional marriage pattern continued to persist despite the drastic political and economic changes that took place over the last 100 years since the collapse of the Russian Empire through the breakdown of the empire of the Soviet Union. Only did the Second World bring short-lived interruptions in age patterns of first marriage. In the mid-1990s, the age at first marriage began to increase, while the first birth is delayed. Cohabitation outside marriage develops intensively. Obviously, Russia is leaving the traditional marriage pattern for a new one. Two-three decades later than the western European countries, Russia is entering the Second Demographic Transition, and in the foreseeable future returning to the previous model of family formation is hardly possible.

Demographic Transition, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth
Abstract: This article investigates the dynamic interactions among demographic transition, income distribution, and economic growth. Consistent with empirical evidence we show that fertility and income distribution follow an inverted U-shaped dynamics in the process of economic development. In the first stage fertility increases and income inequality widens, whereas in the second stage fertility declines, income becomes more equally distributed, human capital becomes more abundant, and growth of income per capita takes off. The model therefore generates the documented facts about epochs of demographic transition, relying neither on arguments based on "near rationality" nor on noneconomic objectives. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. - ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jecgro/v3y1998i1p29-52.html

Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update
Johan Surkyn, Ron Lesthaeghe
Abstract: The core issue in this article is the empirical tracing of the connection between a variety of value orientations and the life course choices concerning living arrangements and family formation. The existence of such a connection is a crucial element in the so-called theory of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). The underlying model is of a recursive nature and based on two effects: firstly, values-based self-selection of individuals into alternative living arrangement or household types, and secondly, event-based adaptation of values to the newly chosen household situation. Any testing of such a recursive model requires the use of panel data. Failing these, only “footprints” of the two effects can be derived and traced in cross-sectional data. Here, use is made of the latest round of the European Values Surveys of 1999-2000, mainly because no other source has such a large selection of value items. The comparison involves two Iberian countries, three western European ones, and two Scandinavian samples. The profiles of the value orientations are based on 80 items which cover a variety of dimensions (e.g. religiosity, ethics, civil morality, family values, social cohesion, expressive values, gender role orientations, trust in institutions, protest proneness and post-materialism, tolerance for minorities etc.). These are analysed according to eight different household positions based on the transitions to independent living, cohabitation and marriage, parenthood and union dissolution. Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) is used to control for confounding effects of other relevant covariates (age, gender, education, economic activity and stratification, urbanity). Subsequently, Correspondence Analysis is used to picture the proximities between the 80 value items and the eight household positions. Very similar value profiles according to household position are found for the three sets of countries, despite the fact that the onset of the SDT in Scandinavia precedes that in the Iberian countries by roughly twenty years. Moreover, the profile similarity remains intact when the comparison is extended to an extra group of seven formerly communist countries in central and Eastern Europe. Such pattern robustness is supportive of the contention that the ideational or “cultural” factor is indeed a non-redundant and necessary (but not a sufficient) element in the explanation of the demographic changes of the SDT. Moreover, the profile similarity also points in the direction of the operation of comparable mechanisms of selection and adaptation in the contrasting European settings. - demographic-research.org/special/3/3/

Completing the Demographic Transition
John Bongaarts11John Bongaarts is Vice President, Policy Research Division, Population Council. Rodolfo A. Bulatao22Rodolfo A. Bulatao is Study Director, Panel on Population Projections, Committee on Population, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.1John Bongaarts is Vice President, Policy Research Division, Population Council.2Rodolfo A. Bulatao is Study Director, Panel on Population Projections, Committee on Population, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
Abstract: Despite ongoing declines in fertility in many countries, the population of the world is experiencing a period of rapid expansion, and its size is expected to reach 10 billion by the end of the demographic transition. Three causes of this growth are identified and quantified: 1) fertility above the replacement level of two surviving children per woman, 2) continuing declines in mortality, and 3) population momentum resulting from a young age structure. A set of simple analytic expressions is proposed for estimating these factors from standard demographic indicators. Population momentum is shown to be the main cause of future growth in most countries and regions. - blackwell-synergy.com

Policy Implications of the Next World Demographic Transition
Sarah F. Harbison11Sarah F. Harbison is Senior Research Advisor, Bureau for Global Health, USAID, Washington, DC. Warren C. Robinson22Warren C. Robinson is an economic consultant, 4753 MacArthur Blvd NW, Washington, DC 20007. E-mail: robharbmat@aol.com.1Sarah F. Harbison is Senior Research Advisor, Bureau for Global Health, USAID, Washington, DC.2Warren C. Robinson is an economic consultant, 4753 MacArthur Blvd NW, Washington, DC 20007. E-mail: robharbmat@aol.com.
Abstract: Although the world demographic transition from high to low fertility appears to be nearing its completion, observed in perspective, this is the latest in a series of such transitions stretching back into prehistory. A stable new equilibrium is far from inevitable; indeed, it is unlikely. Many countries are experiencing below-replacement-level fertility, and this trend is spreading. Couples are now able to choose their family size, free of the traditional pressures to bear children that was characteristic of most traditional societies. In fact, most societal pressures for the last generation have been distinctly antinatalist, in response to the enormous attention paid by the media to the "population bomb" agenda. This antinatalist attitude is changing, however, and what seems more likely than either a stationary or declining world population is a new growth cycle reflecting a resurgence of fertility as a response to growing material affluence and potential technological mastery of environmental challenges. Societal pressures and policies will play a role in this transition as they did in earlier ones. - blackwell-synergy.com

Demographic Transition, Family Structure, and Income Inequality
C. Y. Cyrus Chu, National Taiwan University
Lily Jiang, Tamkang University
We treat each age-specific income-earning member of the family as an income "source," and use the source-specific Gini decomposition approach as well as the Lorenz comparison approach to study the impact of the changing population age structure on family income inequality. Empirical analysis using Taiwanese data shows that the pattern of Gini coefficients is significantly affected by the above-mentioned age composition factor. The general implication is that for many developing countries which have recently gone through rapid demographic transition, family income inequality indexed may implicitly embody information as to the age-specific composition of family members, which is irrelevant to the general notion of inequality. - mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465397557079

Stages of the Demographic Transition from a Child’s Perspective: Family Size, Cohort Size, and Schooling
David Lam and Letícia Marteleto
Abstract: The demographic transition, as typically experienced in developing countries over recent decades, generates a sequence of changes in family size and cohort size that may have important implications for resources available to children. In this paper we provide a new characterization of stages of the demographic transition from a child’s perspective. In the first stage, falling infant and child mortality lead to increasing numbers of surviving children within families and to increases in the size of birth cohorts. In the second stage, falling fertility overtakes falling mortality to produce declining family size, but cohort size continues rising due to population momentum. In the third stage, falling fertility overtakes population momentum to cause declines in the absolute size of birth cohorts. Children born in the first stage face increasing competition for resources at both the family and population levels.
Children born in the second stage face increasing competition at the population level, but have decreasing numbers of siblings. Children born in the third stage experience both declining cohort size and declining family size. We analyze the sequence of stages in a number of countries, with particular emphasis on Brazil, where we have detailed census microdata back to 1960. Brazil entered Stage 2 of the transition before 1970, and entered Stage 3 around 1982, when the largest birth cohort was born.
The resulting decline in the size of the school-age population in the 1990s is associated with large improvements in schooling outcomes. Brazil is typical of many Asian and Latin American countries that have already entered Stage 3 of the transition. Kenya has clearly entered Stage 2, with declines in the number of siblings for school-age children observed between 1990 and 2001, but will probably not enter Stage 3 for at least another decade. - paa2004.princeton.edu/ download.asp?submissionId=42130

Life cycle saving and the demographic transition in East Asia
by Ronald Lee, Andrew Mason, and Timothy Miller
Abstract: In this paper, we simulate the effect of the demographic transition on saving rates and the demand for capital if all savings were for the purpose of spreading consumption smoothly over the life cycle, and if there were no transfers for this purpose other than to children. We assume that people correctly foresee all demographic change, but that expectations about future rates of interest and productivity growth are based on recent experience, using an adhoc procedure, and that these expectactions are typically incorrect. Actual interest rates and productivity growth are treated as exogenous, and are unaffected by savings behavior or demographic change.
We find that under the assumption of pure life cycle saving, aggregate saving rates would decline modestly during early stages of the transition, then rise quite substantially during a long middle period, and then decline again as the population ages rapidly in the last stage of the transition. Our simulated age patterns of income, consumption, and savings rates for Taiwan agree in som respects, but not all, with aggregate savings data and with survey data from Taiwan. Comparisons with other approaches show general qualitative agreement that the demographic transition should boost savings rates for a number of decades, but disagreement about the magnitude of this effect. We believe that our results are of general relevance for countries passing through the demographic transition, provided that life cycle saving, and the financial institutions necessary to sustain it, are present at least in the later stages of the transition. - demog.berkeley.edu/~tmiller/ abstracts/a2000.life.cycle.html

Saving, wealth, and the demographic transition in East Asia
by Ronald Lee, Andrew Mason, and Timothy Miller
Abstract: This paper assesses the extent to which demographic forces can explain the substantial increases in national saving rates in East Asia over the last few decades, under the strong assumption that saving is motivated by a desire to provide for consumption in retirement. Comparative, steady-state analysis shows that relatively low rates of saving should characterize either pre- or post-transition societies, but that post-transition societies have a much higher demand for wealth than do societies yet to have begun their demographic transition. A dynamic simulation model is used to analyze saving rates during the transition. Using detailed demographic and economic data based on the experience of Taiwan, we show that demographic factors may underlie a substantial portion of the rise in net national saving experienced in the region. Further, our model anticipates a rapid decline in saving as countries approach the end of their demographic transitions and achieve high levels of wealth. - demog.berkeley.edu/ ~tmiller/abstracts/a1997.saving.wealth.html

Types of the demographic transition in the countries of Europe (Article in Polish) - Podrazka A.
PIP: 23 European countries were studies on the basis of statistical manuals from individual countries, the INED manual from France, demographic publications of the UN, and the proceedings of the 1974 International Population Conference held in Bucharest. The countries were classified according to duration of demographic transition 70-80, 80-90, 90-100, and 100 years; characteristics of the length of demographic transition (very short, short, average long, very long); the occurrence (peak) and intensity of demographic explosion (the coefficient of natural growth per thousand, 12, 12-14, 14-16. and 16 years); and the characteristics of demographic explosion (very weak, weak, average, strong). Based on these criteria, 7 types of demographic transition were identified. Type 1 was characterized by a very long transition period, 100 years, where demographic explosion took place during 1855-85, and the coefficient of natural growth stayed 14-16 per thousand. France, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain belong here. Type 2 also exhibited a long transition period (almost 100 years). The explosion occurred during 1895-1910 with a natural increase of 14-16 per thousand. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Germany (from 1946 GDR and GFR) belong here. Type 3 is represented by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland with an 80-90 year transition and 12 per thousand natural growth by the end of the 19th century. Type 4 is typified by Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Italy. The transition lasted 80-90 years, but the explosion took place twice: during 1895-1915 and 1920-35. Natural increase stayed 12 per thousand. Type 5 included Greece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal. Transition lasted 80-90 years, and the demographic explosion took place during 1925-35 with natural increase of 12-14 per thousand. Type 6 was represented by Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. The transition was short, 70-80 years. Explosion occurred during 1895-1915 and 1920-35 with a very high natural growth of 16 per thousand. Type 7 was exemplified only by Austria and Hungary, with a very short transition (about 65 years); while a demographic explosion was observed during 1895-1910, natural increase stayed 12 per thousand. The process was longer (90-140 years) in countries where transition started before 1870 than after this data (65-85 years). Significant differences were observed between countries of the northwest and countries of the south east. - ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia
David E. Bloom and Jeffrey G. Williamson
The demographic transition—a change from high to low rates of mortality and fertility—has been more dramatic in East Asia during the twentieth century than in any other region or historical period. By introducing demographic variables into an empirical model of economic growth, this article shows that this transition has contributed substantially to East Asia's so-called economic miracle. The miracle occurred in part because East Asia's demographic transition resulted in its working-age population growing at a much faster rate than its dependent population during 1965–90, thereby expanding the per capita productive capacity of East Asian economies. This effect was not inevitable; rather, it occurred because East Asian countries had social, economic, and political institutions and policies that allowed them to realize the growth potential created by the transition. The empirical analyses indicate that population growth has a purely transitional effect on economic growth; this effect operates only when the dependent and working-age populations are growing at different rates. These results imply that future demographic change will tend to depress growth rates in East Asia, while it will promote more rapid economic growth in Southeast and South Asia. - wber.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/12/3/419

The implications of the demographic transition for women, girls and gender equality: a review of developing country evidence
Kirsty McNay
Pauling Centre for Human Sciences, University of Oxford, 58a Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6QS, UK, kirsty.mcnay@human-sciences.ox.ac.uk
Progress in Development Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 115-134 (2005) DOI: 10.1191/1464993405ps109oa © 2005 SAGE Publications
The demographic transition has become a dramatic global phenomenon, in which most developing countries are now participating. While much has been written about the impact of women’s roles and status on the transition, significantly less has been said about the relationship in the other direction, i.e., the implications of declining mortality and fertility for women’s lives. This paper presents a review of the evidence on these consequences in developing countries. It argues that although the demographic transition is generally a positive process for women, there is not always a straightforward link to improvements in female status and gender equality. - pdj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/5/2/115

The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change
Ronald Lee
doi: 10.1257/089533003772034943
Abstract: The global demographic transition began around 1800 in Europe with declining mortality followed by declining fertility, trends which spread around the world and continue in this century. At the aggregate level, population size greatly increased, growth accelerated and declined with many countries now shrinking, and age distributions inevitably moved from young to old. Population aging has not yet run its course, Its effects exacerbated by declining retirement ages, straining pensions systems and prompting their reform. These aggregate demographic trends reflect profound changes in risks and behavior for individuals and families, and in the shape of the economic life cycle.

What Future Expects Humanity After the Demographic Transition Time?
Kobelev, L. Ya.; Nugaeva, L. L.
Abstract: The variant of phenomenological theory of humankind future existence after time of demographic transition based on treating the time of demographic transition as a point of phase transition and taking into account an appearing of the new phase of mankind is proposed. The theory based on physical phenomenological theories of phase transitions and classical equations for system predatory-preys for two phases of mankind, take into account assumption about a multifractal nature of the set of number of people in temporal axis and contains control parameters. The theory includes scenario of destroying of existent now human population by new phase of humanity and scenario of old and new phases co-existence. In particular cases when the new phase of mankind is absent the equations of theory may be formulated as equations of Kapitza, Foerster, Hoerner, Kobelev and Nugaeva, Johansen and Sornette phenomenological theories of growth of mankind. - adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2000physics..10023K

Europe's Second Demographic Transition.
van de Kaa, Dirk J.
Abstract: By 1985, fertility rates in Europe were below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman in all but Albania, Ireland, Malta, Poland, and Turkey, following a steady decline from a 1965 postwar peak well above 2.5 in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe and an erratic trend from a lower level in Eastern Europe. Natural decrease (fewer births than deaths) had begun already in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and the Federal Republic of Germany and can be expected shortly in many other countries. According to current United Nations medium projections, Europe's population (minus the USSR) will grow only 6 percent between 1985 and 2025, from 492 to 524 million, and 18.4 percent of the population in 2025 will be 65 and over. The decline to low fertility in the 1930s during Europe's first demographic transition was propelled by a concern for family and offspring. Behind the second transition is a dramatic shift in norms toward progressiveness and individualism, which is moving Europeans away from marriage and parenthood. Cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility are increasingly acceptable; having a child is more and more a deliberate choice made to achieve greater self-fulfillment. Many Europeans view population decline and aging as threats to national influence and the welfare state. However, governments outside Eastern Europe, except for France, have hesitated to try politically risky and costly economic pronatalist incentives. As used in Eastern Europe, coupled with some restrictions on legal abortion, such incentives have not managed to boost fertility back up to replacement level. Immigration as a solution is unfeasible. All countries of immigration have now imposed strict controls, tried to stimulate return migration of guestworkers recruited during the labor shortages of the 1960s and early 1970s, and now aim at rapid integration of minorities. Only measures compatible with the shift to individualism might slow or reverse the fertility decline, but a rebound to replacement level seems unlikely and long-term population decline appears inevitable for most of Europe. - eric.ed.gov

The “Second Demographic Transition” in the U.S.: Spatial Patterns and Correlates
Lesthaeghe, Ron Jean Leopold, Lisa Neidert. - PSC Research Report No. 06-592. March 2006.
Abstract: This paper examines the spatial patterns and correlates of fertility among non-Hispanic white women in the United States. While the United States is often discussed as an exception to the below-replacement-fertility patterns of Europe, our analysis documents that marriage and fertility postponement and premarital cohabitation in the US are following the same trends as in western Europe. In fact, several Northeastern states in the US show age-specific fertility trends that are in line with the Netherlands, which has the latest age schedule of fertility in Europe.
The United States is well on its way to a second demographic transition (SDT) with rising ages at marriage, growing rates of cohabitation, increases in single person households, declining remarriage rates, a trend towards fertility postponement, and higher rates of childlessness. However, just as in Europe, major regional leads and lags in patterns of reproduction and political values are present in the United States. The states in the Northeastern US as well as those on the west coast and along the Great Lakes, exhibit family formation and fertility patterns that are very similar to those of Europe, while much of the South, the Great Plains, and some Mountain states, exhibit traditional patterns of fertility based on early marriage and childbearing, and high teen and non-marital fertility. The same states that score high on the SDT factor are also the “blue” states of the last few political elections. The second demographic transition is clearly correlated with religious and political dimensions. After controlling for structural, ethnic, and religious factors, we find that the SDT patterning is co-responsible for the political divide and election results in the US. - psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/abs.html?ID=4052

The Demographic Transition and the Sexual Division of Labor
Bruno L. S. Falcao, Rodrigo R. Soares
NBER Working Paper No. 12838
Abstract: This paper presents a theory where increases in female labor force participation and reductions in the gender wage-gap are generated as part of a single process of demographic transition, characterized by reductions in mortality and fertility. The paper suggests a link between changes in mortality and transformations in the role of women in society that has not been identified before in the literature. Mortality reductions affect the incentives of individuals to invest in human capital and to have children. Particularly, gains in adult longevity reduce fertility, increase investments in market human capital, increase female labor force participation, and reduce the wage differential between men and women. Child mortality reductions, though reducing fertility, do not generate this same pattern of changes. The model reconciles the increase in female labor market participation with the timing of age-specific mortality reductions observed during the demographic transition. It generates changes in fertility, labor market attachment, and the gender wage-gap as part of a single process of social transformation, triggered by reductions in mortality. - nber.org/papers/w12838

Africa's Lagging Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria Ecology and Agricultural Technology
Dalton Conley, Gordon C. McCord, Jeffrey D. Sachs
NBER Working Paper No. 12892
Abstract: Much of Africa has not yet gone through a "demographic transition" to reduced mortality and fertility rates. The fact that the continent's countries remain mired in a Malthusian crisis of high mortality, high fertility, and rapid population growth (with an accompanying state of chronic extreme poverty) has been attributed to many factors ranging from the status of women, pro-natalist policies, poverty itself, and social institutions. There remains, however, a large degree of uncertainty among demographers as to the relative importance of these factors on a comparative or historical basis. Moreover, econometric estimation is complicated by endogeneity among fertility and other variables of interest. We attempt to improve estimation (particularly of the effect of the child mortality variable) by deploying exogenous variation in the ecology of malaria transmission and in agricultural productivity through the staggered introduction of Green Revolution, high-yield seed varieties. Results show that child mortality (proxied by infant mortality) is by far the most important factor among those explaining aggregate total fertility rates, followed by farm productivity. Female literacy (or schooling) and aggregate income do not seem to matter as much, comparatively. - nber.org/papers/w12892

Kerala's Demographic Transition : Determinants and Consequences - edited by K.C. Zachariah and S. Irudaya Rajan. 1997, 367 p., tables, $40.
Contents: 1. Kerala's demographic transition: an overview/K.C. Zachariah and S. Irudaya Rajan. I. Demographic transition: 2. Demographic transition since independence/P.N. Mari Bhat and S. Irudaya Rajan. 3. Demographic transition: a response to official policies and programmes/K.C. Zachariah. 4. Onset of mortality and fertility transition: new evidence from Parish records/S. Irudaya Rajan, P.N. Mari Bhat and Tim Dyson. 5. Fertility, mortality and contraceptive prevalence: evidence from the national family health survey/P.S. Nair. II. Determinants of demographic change: 6. Can poverty determine fertility? Agricultural labourers and their fertility decisions/K.S. James. 7. Determinants and correlates of age at marriage/K. Krishnakumari and G.K. Moli. 8. Education and fertility: is there any link?/D. Radha Devi. III. Consequences of demographic change: 9. Life table analysis of the labour force/S. Sulaja and N.B. Sureshkumar. 10. Dynamics of age at maternity/U.S. Mishra and S. Irudaya Rajan. 11. Low birth weight and need for nutritional care for pregnant women/R.S. Kurup. 12. Population ageing: causes and consequences/S. Irudaya Rajan and U.S. Mishra. 13. Inter-regional comparison of demographic conditions/P. Mohanachandran Nair. IV. Migration: 14. Peasant migration from Travancore to Malabar/K.V. Joseph. 15. Economic consequences of Gulf migration/T.M. Thomas Isaac. 16. Social consequences of international migration: case studies of women left behind/Leela Gulati. References. Index.
"The state of Kerala has been the focus of considerable international attention for its success in several key areas of the social sector including literacy, education, health and family planning. An area in which Kerala has done remarkably well is in demographic transition--namely, changes in the birth and death rates and in the age structure of the population. At the same time, Kerala has a relatively poor record in industrial production and agricultural growth. This would appear to be an anomaly since the widely held belief is that declines in fertility and mortality rates are primarily a consequence of high economic growth rates.
"The purpose of this volume is to understand the reasons why Kerala was able to achieve its demographic transition even in the absence of corresponding buoyancy in the economic sectors in order to draw lessons for both other Indian states and other developing nations. Among the aspects discussed by the contributors are the nature of this transition; the role played by education, age at marriage and the use of contraceptives; the causes and consequences of population ageing; the impact of both internal and external migration; and possible future patterns of population growth and age structure and their socioeconomic implications." (jacket)

Gender Equity Restricted: Indian Demographic Transition Delayed
by William M. Alexander
This paper begins with a focus on the processes of the demographic transition with particular reference to India in the twentieth century. We place India at the low end of the world spectrum of per capita availability of resources. We note the introduction of new technologies which have increased well-being more in Kerala than in India. Next we define gender equity, the major variable within this Indian scenario. This definition will be shown as integral to the robust data on female-to-male ratios and their abnormal decline in India. Fatal daughter syndrome will be shown as the cause of the low female-to-male ratios in the Indian context of limited resources combined with the strong valuation of male lineage. Finally, the parallel traditions of patrilineage in India and matrilineage in Kerala (within India) will be examined and described as integral to gender equity.

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