Bureaucracy Papers Abstracts

Bureaucracy, Syllabus

Can Bureaucracy Benefit Organizational Women? An Exploratory Study
Leisha DeHart-Davis, University of Kansas
Administration & Society, Vol. 41, No. 3, 340-363 (2009)
A significant body of evidence suggests that bureaucratized organizations provide greater career rewards to women than do less bureaucratized organizations. Beyond career rewards, are there ways in which bureaucracy can benefit organizational women? This study explores potential answers to this question by examining perceptions of bureaucracy held by public employees. Analyzing qualitative and quantitative data collected from the employees of four cities in a Midwestern state, the study detects pronounced gender differences in perceptions of bureaucracy, particularly with regard to legitimacy, efficiency, equity, and control. These results suggest ways in which bureaucracy can empower the participation of women in organizations.

Representative Bureaucracy, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance: An Empirical Analysis of English Local Government
Rhys Andrews, George A. Boyne, Cardiff University
Kenneth J. Meier, Texas A&M University and Cardiff University
Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., University of Georgia
Richard M. Walker, University of Hong Kong and Cardiff University
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2005 15(4):489-504; The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that organizations perform better if their workforces reflect the characteristics of their constituent populations. The management literature implies that the impact of representative bureaucracy is contingent on organizational strategy. Our empirical evidence on English local government is inconsistent with the basic theory of representative bureaucracy but supports a moderating effect of organizational strategy. Representative bureaucracy is negatively associated with citizens' perceptions of local authority performance. However, organizations pursuing a prospector strategy are able to mitigate this negative relationship.

Congress and the Bureaucracy as Unlikely Bedfellows: How and Why Federal Agencies Use Statutory Mandates to Constrain the President - Godwin, Erik
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association
Abstract: “Weak” bureaucracy theories have moved to the forefront of the bureaucratic control literature, in large part due to an increasing reliance on dyadic, single-stage models of the policy process. In this paper I offer an alternative model that demonstrates how the presence of multiple principals in a multi-stage process provides the bureaucracy with far greater leverage than previously thought. By arriving at a contract with one principal, the agency can increase the transaction costs to principals at later stages in the policy process. This allows the agency to improve its bargaining position, thereby increasing the likelihood of achieving policy outputs consistent with the agency’s preferences. I then test the foundations of the theory using a dataset of all federal regulations that underwent White House review from 1994-2003. The empirical results support the model – a pre-existing contract with either Congress or the courts significantly reduces the President’s ability to constrain an agency’s preferred policy position.

Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making
Thomas H. Hammond and Jack H. Knott, Michigan State University
Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 12, Number 1 Pp. 119-166
In the past 15 years a scholarly debate has developed in the United States over the question "Who controls the bureaucracy?" Some have argued that Congress has a dominant influence on the bureaucracy, some that the president plays the major role in managing the bureaucracy, and others have emphasized the role of legal constraints on the bureaucracy, as enforced by the courts. Still others have asserted that the bureaucracy has a substantial amount of autonomy from the president, Congress, and courts. This article presents a formal model of multi-institutional policy-making that illuminates several key aspects of this debate. The model shows that there are conditions under which an agency will have considerable autonomy and conditions under which it will have virtually none. The model also shows that when an agency lacks autonomy, control of the agency usually cannot be attributed to just one institution. Finally, the model has some important implications for empirical tests of hypotheses about who controls the bureaucracy; among them is the fact that the empirical literature on control of the bureaucracy is based on a logic that gives a seriously incomplete picture of how the bureaucracy is controlled and who controls it.

The Health Care Bureaucracy: Small Changes, Big Consequences
James A. Morone, Brown University
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1993 18(3):723-739.
Administrative changes have been reshaping health policy for the past decade. One consequence is a more constrained medical profession. Another is a more powerful health care bureaucracy. Most industrialized nations have called on democratic principles to balance professional norms; in contrast, Americans are developing a distinctly bureaucratic health care regime. This article suggests why and explores the ramifications for both the politics of health care and the practice of medicine.

Bureaucracy, Imagination and U.S. Domestic Security Policy
Philip D Bougen, Anderson Schools of Management, University of New Mexico
Pat O'Malley, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney
Security Journal (2009) 22, 101–118; doi:10.1057/palgrave.sj.8350078
Abstract: This paper examines U.S. domestic security policy in the period immediately after 9/11. Official assessment of the circumstances surrounding 9/11 highlighted a lack of imagination in security policy as the major contributing factor to what had transpired. To address policy lapses attributed to failures of imagination it was recommended that for security purposes the practice of imagination become "bureaucratized". The paper examines rationales for the concept of bureaucratized imagination and how this concept has infiltrated specific domestic security initiatives. Images were created to formulate and modify the uncertainties surrounding future threats to security. These images were then employed to translate uncertainties into risk-based security initiatives. The paper highlights how these images developed their own particular logic for security policy, becoming increasingly institutionalized in a security paradigm premised upon images of the merely possible.

Rationalism, bureaucracy, and ethics - S Hasson, M A Goldberg
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 14(1) 15 – 27
Abstract. Traditional models of rationality in science, bureaucracy, and planning are predicated on the existence of a set of means (x1, x2,..., xn,} being available to achieve a set of ends (y1, y2,..., yn). In these models it is assumed that the ends are given and that there is an identifiable causal relationship between the means and the ends. In such a setting, ethical considerations, rooted as they are in subjective values, are seen as irrelevant and do not enter the calculus of the rational planner, scientist, or bureaucrat. The paper is an examination of rationality and value-neutrality in science, bureaucracy and planning, and it is concluded that there should be an explicit consideration and incorporation of ethics into theories of science, bureaucracy, and planning. The ethics argued for is one based on dialogue and synthesis, that overcomes difficulties posed by absolutist and relativist schools of ethics.

The Rise of Post-Bureaucracy - Theorists' Fancy or Organizational Praxis?
Phil Johnson, University of Sheffield, Geoffrey Wood, University of Sheffield, Chris Brewster, Reading University, Michael Brookes, Middlesex University Business School,
International Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 37-61 (2009)
Theories of post-bureaucracy point to a breakdown of traditional modes of managerial authority in the face of a range of pressures commonly associated with globalization and technological advance. This may make for a proliferation of alternative practices and/or allow for a genuine sharing of power in the workplace, associated with higher levels of responsible autonomy. Based on the findings of a series of transnational surveys, this article confirms a tendency, over time, for organizations to make greater use of mechanisms to promote responsible autonomy, in a wide range of national contexts. This would seemingly support a central proposition of theories of post-bureaucracy: a tendency for organizations to delegate more power to employees over time, reflecting the breakdown of traditional bureaucratically ordered power relations. At the same time, however, the research highlighted an uneven and contested process of change, reflecting both the persistent effects of national, regional and sectoral modes of regulation, and the non-linear and episodic nature of organizational change.

The Brazilian civil servant: a typology of bureaucracy - Clarice Gomes de Oliveira
The behavior of bureaucrats has been studied by several theoretical approaches. This paper builds on Downs’ typology of bureaucratic officials (climbers, conservers, advocates, zealots and statesmen) to analyze Brazilian public servants. Questionnaires were applied in order to verify the existence of the typology. Collected data were categorized using cluster analysis. The results show that the division between the bureaucratic profiles is not clear. The obtained clusters reveal characteristics of different bureaucratic roles that were not predicted by Downs.

Technology, Bureaucracy, and Healing in America
By Roger J. Bulger. 97 pages. University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 1988. $14.50.
15 August 1989, Volume 111 Issue 4, Page 346
Abstract: The author presents a thoughtful discussion of the dilemmas facing American medicine and the need for a "new postmodern paradigm." A central concern is the clash between bureaucracy and the Hippocratic theme. Ironically, although U.S. physicians have fought national health insurance and promoted free enterprise, they now find they have done this at the expense of their clinical freedom. British physicians under the National Health Service "observe that their American counterparts work under many more bureaucratic constraints on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis."

Making bureaucracy work.
Ballé M - J Manag Med - 01-JAN-1999; 13(2-3): 190-200
NLM Citation ID: 10747450 (PubMed ID) Journal of management in medicine
Abstract: What gives bureaucracy such a bad name? Is it bureaucracy in itself, or the ghosts in the system who, in a million minor drifts, contribute to turning efficiency into red-tape? Undesirable side-effects need not be confused with necessary first-level effects. There is nothing wrong with the bureaucratic system as such. Ultimately we could not work without it as it is the only known way of co-ordinating vast numbers of people to treat mass problems. However, like any tool, it is only as good as the people who use it, and its results are largely linked to the very agendas of the users. Understanding what makes bureaucracy work requires a good look at the implicit biases in the bureaucratic model, mostly seeded by its various founders and theoreticians, as well as tackling pragmatic issues of creating and applying rules--and where and when to change them.

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness
J. David Brown (Heriot-Watt University)
John S. Earle (earle@upjohninstitute.org) (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and Central European University)
Scott Gehlbach (University of Wisconsin, Madison and CEFIR)
Abstract: Why have economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state been successful in some cases but not others? Are reform failures the consequence of leviathan states that hinder private economic activity, or of weak states unable to implement policies effectively and provide a supportive institutional environment? We explore these questions in a study of privatization in postcommunist Russia. Taking advantage of large regional variation in the size of public administrations, and employing a multilevel re-search design that controls for pre-privatization selection in the estimation of regional privatization effects, we examine the relationship between state bureaucracy and the impact of privatization on firm productivity. We find that privatization is more effective in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. Our analysis suggests that this effect is driven by the impact of bureaucracy on the post-privatization business environment, with better institutional support and less corruption when bueaucracies are large.

Representative Bureaucracy: A Puzzled State?
Kennedy, Brandy
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association
Abstract: Representative bureaucracy is an increasingly important concept to the fields of Public Administration and Political Science. Despite its importance and the prevalence of research in this area, scholars to date have not evaluated the state of representative bureaucracy literature. This essay will survey the literature on representative bureaucracy in order to evaluate the following question: How do scholars define and measure representative bureaucracy? The findings suggest representative bureaucracy literature is riddled with both theoretical and empirical inconsistencies. Scholars have yet to develop a consistent definition of this term. Subsequently, scholars provide inconsistent measures of the presence of representative bureaucracy. In addition, most studies have been contextually circumscribed, focusing primarily on race and gender, street level bureaucrats, SES employees, and redistributive agencies. One of the potential factors which may contribute to these problems is an over-reliance on quantitative data. In order for the field of representative bureaucracy to progress, scholars need to develop a coherent and consistent definition of this term as well as reasonable ways to operationalize and measure representative bureaucracy. In addition, scholars need to expand their focus of representative bureaucracy to include all levels of the bureaucracy and diverse policy areas. One of the critical steps in this process is eliminating the barriers created by an over-reliance on quantitative methodology by introducing more qualitative analysis in the field.

Industries fear barrier to reform, bureaucracy, will stay
Redl, Christopher, Publisher: Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Publication Name: The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly. ISSN: 0191-0132
Abstract: Bureaucracy is seen to remain in Japan, despite campaign promises by the new members of parliament to institute reforms. More than 10,000 regulations govern every business sector in the country, as bureaucrats refuse to relinquish their hold on corporate Japan. The country's elite bureaucrats have not been enjoying a good image, after showing poor performances in relief operations following the Kobe earthquake, financial policy affecting the banking industry and in attempting to whitewash bureaucratic involvement in an AIDS-related controversy. Reduced funding for government agencies and limiting the hiring of policymakers are seen to eliminate bureaucracy.

Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Andrew B. Whitford, University of Kansas, whitford@ku.edu
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2, 167-193 (2002) DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400202
In contrast to principal-agency theory, the possibility of the political control of the bureaucracy depends on bureaucratic structure. In this article, I argue that the functional decentralization of responsibility and authority for policy formulation and implementation involves a net loss of political control. I show that the choice by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to transfer responsibility to its Regional Offices changed the ability of national political superiors to intervene in policy implementation in the field. Examining Regional Office data on the enforcement of reactor regulations from 1975 to 1996, I present statistical tests of the changing influence of national political institutions, local policy preferences, and the Regions’ task environment. I find that decentralization insulated the NRC from national political oversight, and that the Regions were more responsive to local oversight postdevolution and deviated from a ‘natural rate’ of enforcement.

Organizational Subcultures in a Soft Bureaucracy: Resistance Behind the Myth and Facade of an Official Culture
John M. Jermier, John W. Slocum, Louis W. Fry, Jeannie Gaines
College of Business, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida 33620
Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75275
LWF Enterprises, Inc., 4250 Five Points Road, Corpus Christi, Texas 78410
University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 170-194. DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2.2.170
The primary purpose of this study was to compare and contrast an organization's official culture and its subcultures. The proposition that soft bureaucracies project a rigid exterior appearance, symbolizing what key stakeholders expect, while masking a loosely-coupled set of interior practices, guided this analysis of a police organization. The official culture (crime-fighting command bureaucracy) was examined as an arbitrary set of symbols and meaning structures arranged according to top management preferences. Using qualitative and quantitative data, the organization's subcultures were profiled. It was demonstrated that top management was unable to impose organization-wide conformance with the official culture. There was close conformance to the official culture in only one of five distinct clusters of officers ("crime-fighting commandoes," 21 percent of the sample). Officers in the other clusters ("crime-fighting street professionals," "peace-keeping moral entrepreneurs," "ass-covering legalists," and "anti-military social workers") substantially modified or rejected top management's dictates. They represented resistance subcultures, similar in their opposition to official culture, but unique in form. It was concluded that other organizations, not known for their monolithic image and solidarity, also encompass subcultures.

Politics, bureaucracy and social networks: the case of nominees for high level positions within the Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil).
OLIVIERI, Cecília.
Rev. Sociol. Polit. [online]. 2007, n.29, pp. 147-168. ISSN 0104-4478. doi: 10.1590/S0104-44782007000200011.
The study of nominees to high level positions within the Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) through social network analysis enables us to understand fundamental aspects of the Brazilian political and administrative system. Choice of public administrators affects the governability and governing of the country. The exchange of positions for parliamentary support can work to guarantee government stability, but it may also reduce the president's control over bureaucracy and the management of public policies. Social network analysis makes it possible to determine what criteria have been used in the choice of public administrators, revealing new patterns of State-society interface and paving the way for the study of accountability in the relationship between public administratores and bureaucracy, and between government and society.

A Mixed Relationship: Bureaucracy and School Performance
Kevin B. Smith1; Christopher W. Larimer2
Public Administration Review, Volume 64, Number 6, November 2004 , pp. 728-736(9)
Abstract: We argue the negative relationship between school bureaucracy and school performance that is commonly reported in the bureaucracy and educational policy literature is theoretically and empirically incomplete. Like most public agencies operating in complex task environments, we suggest that schools have to make trade-offs between the multiple outputs they are expected to produce. Bureaucracy plays an important role in determining the nature of these trade-offs: one that is more multidimensional than it is portrayed in the existing literature. We find bureaucracy's relationship with school performance depends on how performance is measured. It is negatively associated with test scores but positively associated with other performance measures such as attendance and dropout rates. This is consistent with an economies-of-scope perspective of bureaucracy, which emphasizes bureaucracy's role in managing the trade-offs inherent in pursuing multiple goals.

Street-level bureaucracy and family group decision making in the USA
by: William Vesneski
Child & Family Social Work, Vol. 14, No. 1. (2009), pp. 1-5.
Abstract: Since its official recognition in New Zealand law in 1989, family group decision making (FGDM) has been utilized by a growing number of child welfare workers throughout the world. In the USA, social workers in 35 states utilize FGDM. The seeming popularity of the practice, however, belies its complex position in American child welfare policy. This brief analytic essay examines this position by focusing on the relationship between street-level bureaucracy and FGDM. Specifically, it describes the role of street-level bureaucracy in FGDM's diffusion throughout the USA during a time of considerable policy skepticism towards family support, and it explains the dilution of the FGDM model through use of street-level bureaucracy theory. The essay concludes by raising important policy questions concerning the use and replication of FGDM in the USA.

The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory
Daniel McFadden
The RAND Journal of Economics Volume 6, No. 2 Issue: Autumn 1975 Pages: pp. 401-416
Abstract: A method is developed for inferring, from the consequences or outcomes of organizational decisions, an implicit choice criterion such that the organization behaves as if it were following this decision rule. The method is quantified for the case of a public bureaucracy facing discrete alternatives, and is applied in a study of the decision rules underlying freeway route selection by a state division of highways. Tests are carried out on the form of the benefit-cost calculus utilized by the bureaucracy, on the implicit evaluation of indirect benefits and costs, and on the influence of political factors on routing decisions.

Standards for Surface Analysis: A Clash between Bureaucracy and Science?
M. P. Seah
Abstract: Scientists at the frontiers of research are often disturbed by the threat that they themselves may have to conform to standards or that they may have to use standards which curtail their freedom of action. Hence the perceived `clash' of the title. It is important to recognize that there are two main classes of standards: (i) reference standards, with traceability to the SI system of measurement; and (ii) documentary standards, established through approved bodies with due consultation with relevant experts. In the first class of standard, it is clear that very few measurements can be meaningfully transferred from laboratory to laboratory without a degree of traceability. Furthermore, as the traceability increases, the value of networking increases and cooperative activity becomes more constructive. The value of traceability will be illustrated by developments in electron spectroscopy which make data-basing activities very powerful and which allow crucial tests of theory. In the second class, standards are now being established through ISO. Properly constituted, two aspects deserve discussion. Firstly, documentary standards may embody a distillation of our expertise which may reach a far greater body of users than most other written articles and, secondly, these standards enable us to do our own research more effectively.

Harry Potter and the Half-Crazed Bureaucracy
Benjamin Barton
University of Tennessee College of Law
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 104, May 2006
Abstract:
This Essay examines what the Harry Potter series (and particularly the most recent book, The Half-Blood Prince) tells us about government and bureaucracy. There are two short answers. The first is that Rowling presents a government (The Ministry of Magic) that is 100% bureaucracy. There is no discernable executive or legislative branch, and no elections. There is a modified judicial function, but it appears to be completely dominated by the bureaucracy, and certainly does not serve as an independent check on governmental excess.
Second, government is controlled by and for the benefit of the self-interested bureaucrat. The most cold-blooded public choice theorist could not present a bleaker portrait of a government captured by special interests and motivated solely by a desire to increase bureaucratic power and influence. Consider this partial list of government activities: a) torturing children for lying; b) utilizing a prison designed and staffed specifically to suck all life and hope out of the inmates; c) placing citizens in that prison without a hearing; d) allows the death penalty without a trial; e) allowing the powerful, rich or famous to control policy and practice; f) selective prosecution (the powerful go unpunished and the unpopular face trumped-up charges); g) conducting criminal trials without independent defense counsel; h) using truth serum to force confessions; i) maintaining constant surveillance over all citizens; j) allowing no elections whatsoever and no democratic lawmaking process; k) controlling the press.
This partial list of activities brings home just how bleak Rowling's portrait of government is. The critique is even more devastating because the governmental actors and actions in the book look and feel so authentic and familiar. Cornelius Fudge, the original Minister of Magic, perfectly fits our notion of a bumbling politician just trying to hang onto his job. Delores Umbridge is the classic small-minded bureaucrat who only cares about rules, discipline, and her own power. Rufus Scrimgeour is a George Bush-like war leader, inspiring confidence through his steely resolve. The Ministry itself is made up of various sub-ministries with goofy names (e.g., The Goblin Liaison Office or the Ludicrous Patents Office) enforcing silly sounding regulations (e.g., The Decree for the Treatment of Non-Wizard Part-Humans or The Decree for the Reasonable Restriction of Underage Sorcery). These descriptions of government jibe with our own sarcastic views of bureaucracy and bureaucrats: bureaucrats tend to be amusing characters that propagate and enforce laws of limited utility with unwieldy names. When you combine the light-hearted satire with the above list of government activities, however, Rowling's critique of government becomes substantially darker and more powerful.
Furthermore, Rowling eliminates many of the progressive defenses of bureaucracy. The most obvious omission is the elimination of the democratic defense. The first line of attack against public choice theory is always that bureaucrats must answer to elected officials, who must in turn answer to the voters. Rowling eliminates this defense by presenting a wholly unelected government.
A second line of defense is the public-minded bureaucrat. Some theorists argue that the public choice critique ignores what government officials are really like. They are not greedy, self-interested budget-maximizers. Instead, they are decent and publicly oriented. Rowling parries this defense by her presentation of successful bureaucrats (who clearly fit the public choice model) and unsuccessful bureaucrats. Harry's best friend's Dad, Arthur Weasley is a well-meaning government employee. He is described as stuck in a dead end job, in the least respected part of the government, in the worst office in the building. In Rowling's world governmental virtue is disrespected and punished.
Lastly, Rowling even eliminates the free press as a check on government power. The wizarding newspaper, The Daily Prophet, is depicted as a puppet to the whims of Ministry of Magic. I end the piece with some speculation about how Rowling came to her bleak vision of government, and the greater societal effects it might have. Speculating about the effects of Rowling's portrait of government is obviously dangerous, but it seems likely that we will see a continuing uptick in distrust of government and libertarianism as the Harry Potter generation reaches adulthood.

Latinos and Representative Bureaucracy Testing the Thompson and Henderson Hypotheses
Kenneth J. Meier, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4: 393-414 (1993) © 1993 Public Management Research Association
This paper examines the ability of Latino teachers and administrators to serve as active representatives for Latino students. Using twelve school districts in Florida, this study provides strong evidence for active representation. Thompson's (1976) hypothesis that street-level bureaucrats are more likely than upper-level bureaucrats to serve as active representatives is supported by the analysis. Also supported by the analysis is Henderson's (1979) hypothesis that a critical mass of administrators of one group is needed before one can expect administrators actively to represent the interests of a minority group.

Bureaucracy Neutrality in Politics: Case Study of Civil Servant (PNS) Neutrality in The Governor Election in South Sulawesi 2007 and Banten 2006, Political Science Study Program
Sudiman
Abstract: The relationship between bureaucracy and politics in Indonesia always fluctuates. In the New Order Era with mono loyalty policy, the bureaucratic machine was constantly manipulated by the ruling regime to conduct political mobilization in order to support the status quo. After the fall of the New Order regime, the Reform Era reigned in 1998 with fundamental changes occurring in political system, particularly those concerning with the relationship between the central and local government, from centralistic to a more autonomous and decentralized system. Similarly, the local leaders were previously elected by the Regional House of Representatives, but they are now elected directly by their constituents. On one hand the change gives a favorable meaning that is to increase society’s political participation, the civil servants, on the other hand, are fragmented into practical political interest.
This dissertation endeavored to see to what extent the neutrality of bureaucracy in the local political contest, that is, the election of local leaders post the New Order regime. The opted case study was the Governor’s election in South Sulawesi and Banten. The main issues to address were: (i) what factors influenced the civil servants’ neutral behavior in the political contest at local level, (ii) what form were civil servants’ biases, and (iii) what were the impacts of the civil servants’ biases towards (i) results of local leaders’ election, (ii) public services, and (iii) the change in structural positions in those two provinces. This research used qualitative approach. The data were collected by using such techniques as in-depth interview, library research, focus group discussion, and media review.
The results of this study elaborated that nearly all bureaucratic machines in both cases of Governors’ election in South Sulawesi and Banten were manipulated by the rulers to prolong their authority. The were so many civil servants breaking the rules and involving in the practical politics that the results of regional leaders’ election were claimed. This made the civil servant’s career development with the merit system could not be implemented. There were internal factors influencing the neutrality of bureaucracy, such as primordial sentiment, the logic of power. Externally, there were ambiguous regulations that made the bureaucracy bias and independent. The primordial factors inclined towards the proximity of ethnics, race and religions. Whereas the logical power was applied because there was the inconsistent system in the civil service career path. There was a political and power speculation from the side of civil servants who were expected to provide political support to the contestant of the local leaders’ election, that is, the feasibility of improving their career in the bureaucracy when their candidates won. Similarly, Banten had shadow state, namely, the power outside bureaucracy that was able to control bureaucracy. The dominant power emerged from groups of the “jawara” and investors that possessed political access to central power.
The research also elaborated that political liberalization and reform was, in fact, not followed by the reform at regulation level. On one hand the civil servants were expected to have professional attitude in their career path. On the other hand, they are very much dependent on the civil service authorized officials, in this context, the Governor, the Regent or the Mayor who are political officials elected by political mechanism. Therefore the elected local leaders from the political party hold a powerful authority to retain the civil servants in practical politics.
Political and bureaucratic culture factors in Indonesia were, in fact, directly incompatible with the process of political liberalization and democratic system. In the society still adopting political patronage and feudalistic culture, bureaucratic neutrality remained very utopian. The relationship pattern of patron-client and in-return-favor politics made the civil servants’ position vulnerable to be co-opted by the interest of political regime at local level.
The theoretical implication of the research was the deconstruction of the concept of bureaucracy concerning with the meaning of professionalism, neutrality, rationality. Weber’s theoretical construction about bureaucracy is very ideal. It seemingly ignores the availability of political intervention. The fact is that the bureaucracy is often produced by the political process. Carino’s concept about bureaucracy ascendancy and sublation is more realistic and empirical in viewing the bureaucratic issues. Carino understands that bureaucracy is not free from political intervention because bureaucracy is the product of political process based on the election mandate. Therefore, a political officer in a bureaucracy elected based on election mandate makes the bureaucracy in the position of vulnerably being directed to meet the political interests.
The results of this study particularly elaborated that modernization in the culture of bureaucracy and that of society politics as understood and applied by the developed countries had to undergo re-interpretation and indigenousness when implemented in the developing countries with all their internal dynamics. There were contexts and local values that influenced the meaning of bureaucracy neutrality.

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